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This paper provides the results of analyses of key problems related to pension 
systems and their reforms in Russia and Ukraine. The pension systems and their 
reforms in both countries are compared. They are also compared with the general 
picture observed in the OECD or selected countries belonging to that area. The 
analysis focuses on long-term trends rather than short-term shocks. The recent 
economic crisis is not covered since the analysis was mostly completed by 2008. 
First, we present the general picture which describes the current demographic and 
economic situations as well as the challenges that are being faced. Then we turn to 
reform options and actions already taken. We particularly focus on issues that are 
specific to the countries analyzed. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
 
CASE Network Reports No. 91  8 
Introduction 
Russia and Ukraine are in the process of many changes stemming from eco-
nomic transition, restructuring, demographic change and other various ongoing 
challenges. In terms of the ongoing challenges in each country, there are specific 
problems related to historical developments, such as large scale heavy industry, 
but also potential opportunities that rarely occur in other countries such as the 
significant additional income from the countries’ abundant natural resources. 
Both countries have good prospects for the future despite the many challenges.
1 
Among the challenges is industrial restructuring taking into account the social 
dimension, which includes adjusting the current arrangements of pension systems. 
In the best scenario this could mean a pension reform. 
The term ‘pension reform’ can be understood in various ways. In this paper we 
analyse a wide variety of possible pension system designs. The designs vary by 
target as well as the various ways to reach those targets. In all cases there may be 
costs and/or savings problems (as well as liquidity problems, which are not a 
“cost” from the economic viewpoint as liquidity is accounted as if additional cost 
were created) and various positive and/or negative economic, financial, and social 
externalities associated with the pension system designs. 
Pension systems face problems all over the world. The demographic transition 
is a world-wide phenomenon leading to population ageing, which in turn leads to 
financial problems in pension systems which influence public finance. In reality, 
public finance is affected not only by population ageing via pension and other 
social expenditures but also via many other channels. Demographic transition de-
scribes the shift from high fertility and high mortality rates until the 18
th-19
th cen-
tury, high fertility and low mortality rates until the second half of the 20
th century, 
and low fertility and low mortality rates in the present day and in the near future. 
This transition has taken place in all OECD countries as well as Russia and 
Ukraine (and many other countries not analyzed here).  
However, different mortality dynamics are observed in Russia and Ukraine. In-
stead of an increase in life expectancy rates, as is happening in most OECD coun-
                                                 
1 The current financial and economic crisis has strongly undermined economic activity in 
many countries, including Russia and Ukraine. However, in the long run, their effect will 
probably be absorbed. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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tries, there has been a decrease in both countries.
2 This especially applies to male 
life expectancy. The demographic transition is occurring in a specific way in both 
countries, which creates an additional factor to be taken into analysis on top of 
other issues related to restructuring. 
In both countries, workers exit labour markets relatively early. This applies to 
both formal and actual labour market deactivation
3. In both countries, a large por-
tion of economic activity is performed in the shadow economy. 
Factors associated with the former Soviet pension system, ageing, and eco-
nomic transition (e.g., the sharp drop in real incomes due to inflation and an in-
crease in poverty rates) are the same for both Russia and Ukraine.  
The shortcomings of the pension systems in both countries have remained basi-
cally unchanged since the Soviet era. They include: 
•  Extremely high rate of budget financing; 
•  Paternalism; exclusion of employees from directly contributing to their 
future pensions;  
•  Weak link between benefits and former employment records (seniority, 
wage, contributions); 
•  Inequalities among different groups of pensioners unrelated to their con-
tributions to the pension system; 
•  Low level of pension benefits which forces an increase in the incomes of 
the poorest and leads to low benefit differentiation; 
•  Actual pension age is even lower than official age, which is still 55 for 
women and 60 for men. 
It seems that up until the current financial crisis, Russia had an advantage over 
Ukraine: its government was able to consistently keep pension expenditures at 
relatively low levels (5-6% of GDP). In the early 2000s, the high extra-incomes 
from natural resources received by the Russian economy helped maintain GDP 
levels high and pension expenditures relatively low. But the favorable economic 
conditions that provided the financial resources needed to start reforming the pen-
                                                 
2 There are signs of a slight increase in life expectancy in Russia in recent years 
3 In Russia, workers enter the pension system very early compared with Western countries; 
the average pension age of both sexes is 53. But the retirement age is higher because of the 
right to both get full pension and work. According to LABORSTA (ILO), in 2007, in Rus-
sia 50.7% of 55-59 years old women were employed compared to 80.1% in Sweden, 
66.6% in the USA, 55.3% in France and 34.76% in Italy. Among 60-64 year old women, 
23.8% worked in Russia, 59.1% in Sweden, 47.9% in the USA, 15.2% in France and 
10.8% in Italy. Among 60-64 year old men, 38.5% were employed in Russia, 67.7% in 
Sweden, 59.2% in the USA, 29.7% in Italy and 17.5% in France. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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sion system made it unnecessary to take further unpopular political steps and to 
radically reform the pension system.  
Until recently, Russia was also a step ahead of Ukraine in terms of implement-
ing pension reforms. The course of the reforms was similar in both countries, 
which should have given Ukraine an advantage in that Ukraine could learn from 
the problems faced by Russia. There are certain commonalities in the reforms in 
both countries; both countries started introducing fully funded pillars and private 
insurance schemes. However, even in Russia, which had a more balanced and less 
expensive pension system, the reforms did not ensure the long-term sustainability 
of the pension system. The ongoing reform did not lead to an increase in the effec-
tive pension age. Nothing has been done with the reform of the so called ‘early 
retirement schemes’ covering people employed in hard/hazardous conditions or in 
the Far North regions. The fact that the size of a funded pillar is and will be small 
means that the new pension system will suffer from demographic ageing in the 
same way as the previous one. 
The crisis of 2008 worsened the situation in both countries. During the last two 
years in Russia, substantial changes occurred in the course of pension reform. The 
pension benefits were radically increased at the expense of the financial sustain-
ability of the system. It seems that Russia followed Ukraine in its erroneous popu-
list policies in the area under discussion. The crisis was accompanied by a slump 
in energy prices which depleted the funds that could have been used for the pen-
sion reform. It also revealed the weaknesses of the Russian pension system which 
are not very different from what is observed in Ukraine. On the eve of the new 
decade of the 21
st century, both countries have badly organized and unbalanced 
pension systems that urgently need to be reformed.  
This paper provides the results of analyses of key problems related to pension 
systems and their reforms in Russia and Ukraine. The pension systems and their 
reforms in both countries are compared. They are also compared with the general 
picture observed in the OECD or selected countries belonging to that area. The 
analysis focuses on long-term trends rather than short-term shocks. The recent 
economic crisis is not covered since the analysis was mostly completed by 2008. 
First, we present the general picture which describes the current demographic 
and economic situations as well as the challenges that are being faced. Then we 
turn to reform options and actions already taken. We particularly focus on issues 
that are specific to the countries analyzed. 
 PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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1. General Background 
The general idea of a pension system is to provide people with a method of in-
come allocation over their life cycle. Pension systems work in various ways. There 
can be individual allocation or allocation that is not individualized but works for 
the entire population. The first is usually called “funded”, although this term is not 
well defined. The second is typically called “pay-as-you-go,” and its definition is 
also not very clear. In theory, both approaches should lead to the same or at least a 
similar outcome. In practice, they lead to different outcomes. This matters espe-
cially in times of high pension spending, after the collapse of a financial pyramid 
using a demographic pyramid. It is much more difficult to reduce the burden on 
workers in systems that do not individualize participation. 
Traditionally, the term “intergenerational solidarity” is used in the area of pen-
sions. This is partially misleading. A pension system is or is not based on solidar-
ity irrespective of whether it is individualized or not. Workers need to share part of 
their product with the retired. This can be done via taxation (imposing a so-called 
‘social tax’) or via markets. In the latter case, workers buy assets owned by the 
retired. This has little to do with solidarity. This is only a question of whether or 
not politicians are involved in the process of deciding on contributions and bene-
fits or not and this role is played by the markets. None of the options has much to 
do with the concept of solidarity. Eventually only the systems that converge to an 
intergenerational equilibrium can work in the long-term. The pension system is the 
most suitable area to think of in terms of the long-term.  
Generally, there are three basic designs plus two mixed ones that can be used to 
organize a pension system: 
1.  Social tax based systems called Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) 
2.  Savings/insurance based systems typically called “funded”. They typi-
cally use financial markets (called FDC - financial defined contribution 
systems) but this is not really needed. On the other hand, if only gov-
ernment bonds are bought in financial markets, then a funded system is 
in fact a kind of NDC 
3.  A combined system that uses both taxation and markets 
4.  NDC (non-financial defined contribution system) that is actually differ-
ent from both traditional types of pension system designs Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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5.  A combination of NDC and FDC 
The preferred design of a pension system depends on a number of factors in-
cluding the social system and the cultural and historical development of the coun-
try implementing the system. However, the feasibility and long-term sustainability 
of the system depends on demographics and the economic development in the 
country. Here, we analyze current and suggested future pension systems in Russia 
and Ukraine in conjunction with their economic development to demonstrate their 
long-term prospects. 
A country’s pension system affects industrial restructuring through various 
channels, including: 
•  Tax wedge creating an influence on public finance; 
•  Tax wedge creating an influence on labor supply and mobility; 
•  Availability of benefits creating an influence on incentives for labor sup-
ply and mobility; 
•  Tax wedge creating an influence on labor demand and restructuring. 
In addition to the above channels, social policy and political problems add to 
the overall difficulty faced by ageing societies. 
The goal for pension reform can be formulated in various ways. Here, follow-
ing Góra (2003) and Góra and Palmer (2004), we understand the goal of the pen-
sion system reform as reintroducing intergenerational equilibrium. One of dimen-
sions of that is: 
PV(B) = PV(C) 
where: B = benefits; C = contributions. 
The equation above should be understood at both the macro as well as at the 
individual level of aggregation. This implies that the welfare of all generations is 
equally important. On the top of this, pension systems can reach financial stability. 
The latter affects restructuring indirectly, while the former affects it directly. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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2. Demographic and Economic  
Issues 
Demographic and economic developments in Russia and Ukraine during the 
last two decades created conditions for the long-term instability of pension sys-
tems in the two countries. The transition type of recession that started at the be-
ginning of 1990s reduced the productivity of labor and created hidden unemploy-
ment. Combined with an aging population, it decreased the workers to pensioners 
ratio, making the Soviet-type PAYG system unsustainable. At the same time, un-
derdeveloped capital markets, the low income of the population, and distrust in the 
banking system created constraints to reforming the system. 
In this chapter, we discuss current economic and demographic issues in both 
countries. We look at the common trends and differences in the factors that affect 
the development of pension systems. This chapter provides the background for 
further discussion in this paper. 
 
 
2.1.  Transition and economic development 
 
Economic conditions have a significant impact on the long-term stability of 
pension systems. Here we analyze the development of three of these important 
factors in Russia and Ukraine.  
The first is labor productivity and employment. Both affect total labor income 
in a country. A reduction in total labor income decreases the amount of money 
available to redistribute to pensioners and lowers the income available for inter-
temporal redistribution. 
The second is return on investments. This factor is important for the pension 
systems that use an inter-temporal transfer of income since the higher return on 
investment allows current employees to invest a lower portion on labor income in 
order to receive dissent pension after retirement or take retirement earlier.  
The third is financial market development. A solid banking system trusted by 
the population is an important instrument of the inter-temporal distribution of in-Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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come through personal savings. A well-developed stock market offers instruments 
for savings and investment that can be used by individuals and by different types 
of pension systems to accumulate pension resources.  
Below we discuss how these factors progressed in the two countries, and the 
expected mid and long-term development of these factors that will determine the 
most robust design for a pension system in each country. 
 
2.1.1.  Russia 
 
In Russia economic reforms were launched January 1, 1992, starting with price 
liberalization. The basic stage of economic reforms was accompanied by an essen-
tial economic recession and quite a long period of high inflation (Table 1). In Au-
gust 1998, the country experienced an extensive financial crisis, ruble devaluation 
and a default on government bonds. Contrary to the current crisis, the recovery of 
the national economy from was rather quick. As a result, the decade between the 
1998 and 2008 crises was a period of economic growth and fiscal stabilization that 
made income and employment recovery possible
4.  
Favorable dynamics of world oil and gas prices prevented the Russian govern-
ment from making necessary but difficult structural reforms. Foreign investments 
in Russia, though rather low, could hardly be absorbed by the limited number of 
investment projects [Development Center 2007]. These factors make the conse-
quences of the world financial crisis of 2008 deeper in Russia compared to other 
countries with similar levels of development. Today it is evident that the Russian 
economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks, which is really important when 
we talk about substantial pension reform and accumulating pension savings. 
Since current economic growth has not been accompanied by an improvement 
in the institutional environment and the enforcement of new laws [Kuzminov, 
Radaev et al. 2005], Russia has a high level of risks related to the definition and 
protection of property rights, “domination of the law”, taxation administration, 
level of corruption, and similar parameters describing the quality of institutes 
[Gurvich, 2005]. These institutional risks are very important for a funded (finan-
cial) pension system based on individual accounts.  
A particular feature of the Russian labor market is that it responded to the eco-
nomic recession with a dramatic drop in real wages and an expansion of wage 
arrears instead of the mass dismissal of workers (Figure 1). Unemployment rates 
were never as high as in Central Europe (CEE) and never exceeded 14% of the 
                                                 
4 See more detailed description of trends of Russian economy in [Gora et al, 2008]. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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economically active population. Registered unemployment (those eligible for 
benefits) was 2-3 times lower than open unemployment measured by the ILO 
methodology. The whole period of the development of modern Russia shows that 
the elasticity of wages to GDP fluctuation was very high, while that of employ-
ment was low [Gimpelson, Kapelyushnikov 2007]. According to Earle and Sabiri-
anova [2001], in the end of the 1990s, the Russian economy was in a “bad” equi-
librium, assuming a certain amount of arrears; hence the costs of getting out of this 
equilibrium were higher than the costs of preventing arrears. There is some pre-
liminary evidence that the current crisis did not change the specific model of the 
Russian labor market [Kapelyushnikov 2009]: wage elasticity is again higher than 
the elasticity of employment, wage arrears are increasing, although not as rapidly 
as in the 1990s. 
 
Figure 1. Indices of annual changes in real GDP, real wage and employment in Russia 








1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
%
GDP in constant prices
Employment
Average monthly wage in constant prices
 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on the Goskomstat (1997): Social Situation and Liv-
ing Standard of Population of Russia; Goskomstat (2002): Social Situation and Living 
Standard of Population of Russia; Goskomstat (2003): Social Situation and Living Stan-
dard of Population of Russia; Rosstat (2009): Short-Term Economic Indicators of Russian 
Federation, July 2009. 
 
The economic transition has radically changed the structure of the Russian 
economy and labor market. The following three dimensions are of particular inter-Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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est: privatization, decentralization and deindustrialization. As a consequence of 
privatization, in 2008, 82.5% of firms were completely private in Russia. Those 
firms hired 57.1% of total employed workers.  
The Soviet economy was based predominantly on large enterprises. Still, in the 
beginning of the 2000s, nearly 2/3 of total employment was covered by employ-
ment at large and medium enterprises [Maleva et al, 2002: 52]. However the num-
ber of people employed in small firms increased in recent years, whereas employ-
ment at large firms decreased. Decentralization in this sense could be considered a 
positive sign of the improved adaptation of the Russian labor market to a market 
economy. Nevertheless, there are still more informal jobs in small firms than in 
large enterprises. Besides, small firms often use the so-called “simplified” taxation 
regime and do not pay a unified social tax (UST). As a result, people hired by 
small firms and individual entrepreneurs are limited in their future pension rights, 
because of the lower contributions paid by their employers.  
The economic transition was accompanied by a rapid growth of employment in 
the service economy, particularly in trade. In 2008, 17.6% of the employed popu-
lation worked in trade. This also provokes the process of lowering the quality of 
jobs given that trade has the largest incidence of informal employment [Gimpel-
son, Kapelyushnikov, eds., 2006; Sinyavskaya, 2005], which is important for the 
pension system. 
Another peculiarity of Russian economic development important to the design 
of a pension reform relates to the significantly higher income and wage inequali-
ties in Russia compared to CEE (Table 2). In 2001, on the eve of the pension re-
form, the Gini coefficient for gross earnings was 52.1% in Russia (as opposed to 
45.1% in 2006), while it was only 38.8% in Estonia, 38.6% in Hungary, 32.2% in 
Latvia, and 27.2% in the Czech Republic
5. This inequality exists within sectors, 
between sectors and particularly between different settlements and regions. The 
national pension system tries to provide average standards of living of the elderly 
population in all regions and settlements and consequently involves substantial 
redistribution.   
The incidence of poverty increased sharply during the first period of economic 
transition
6. In 1992 and 1999 there were 33.5% and 29.9% of people with incomes 
                                                 
5 Data on Gini coefficient are from Transmonee 2004, Transmonee 2008, downloaded 
from World Income Inequality Database, UNU WIDER 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/ . Russian statistical agency 
(Rosstat) gives slightly different figures on inequality (see Table 2). 
 
6 Official measurement of poverty rate is based on the absolute concept of poverty with 
the subsistence minimum as a poverty line. The methodology of subsistence minimum PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 91  17 
below the poverty line, respectively. But much of the poverty in Russia is rela-
tively transitory [Office of the U.N. 2002]. The decrease in the incidence of pov-
erty in Russia in recent years was driven largely by economic growth [Ibid.]. In 
2008, 13.1% of population was considered poor.  
The sharp and deepening social and economic inequality between regions and 
settlements obviously creates incentives for internal migration, which becomes 
more closely correlated with the socio-economic development of a region (namely, 
with regional and settlement income and poverty level, labor market conditions, 
unemployment rate, costs of living, social situation, etc.)
7. At the same time, ex-
perts have established a slowdown in migration and a reduction of population mo-
bility between different parts of Russia. The reasons for this cutting-down include 
a lack of necessary information and enormous interregional inequalities, mani-
fested in huge differences in housing prices and costs of living, which make mov-
ing very expensive and impossible for the poor. Being a by-product of regional 
inequalities, low interregional mobility itself is an obstacle for the further devel-
opment of regional and local labor and housing markets. Finally, keeping or even 
intensifying this enormous inequality has negative outcomes for the future of the 
pension system. 
 
2.1.2.  Ukraine 
 
Ukraine became an independent country on August 24, 1991, formally diverg-
ing from the common development with Russia that it had when both countries 
were part of the USSR. However, similar to Russia, Ukraine experienced a sharp 
economic decline at the end of ‘80s and the beginning of the ‘90s. Real GDP in 
1998 was 59% less than in , the last year before the independence (see Table 4). 
The economic crisis was also accompanied by high inflation, which reached 
10,256% a year in 1993, and was slowed to less than 20% only in 1996. Hyperin-
flation significantly decreased real incomes, destroyed the banking system and 
diminished private savings. People could not generate sufficient wage income, and 
time-reallocation options (either saving or borrowing) were not available. Inflation 
was taken under control at the end of 20
th century, but remains at two-digit levels 
on average. However, economists agree that any significant increase in the amount 
of money transfers to the poorest parts of the population (through SSN) may trig-
                                                                                                                           
assessment changed in 1992 and 2000, leading to the incomparability of official poverty 
rates. 
7 This paragraph is written based on the information from the following sources: IISP So-
cial Atlas of Russian regions – http://atlas.socpol.ru/index.shtml and the article by N. 
Mkrtchan [2002] http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2002/079/tema01.php. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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ger an increase in inflation to 1996 levels. The two-digit inflation resurfaced in 
2004 (with an inflation rate of 12.3%), the first year in which there was a signifi-
cant increase in social transfers to the population. This trend continued over the 
next three years, with inflation reaching 16.6% in 2007. 
All of these factors contributed to a significant increase in the number of peo-
ple living on low incomes and relying on the government to combat poverty. Offi-
cial statistics indicate that during the Soviet period, poverty in Ukraine was only 
about 6%
8. When the economic crisis occurred, poverty increased rapidly. First, 
the crisis sped up job destruction: by the end of 1998, 2.9 million people were 
unemployed (26% more than in 1997). Second, the crisis temporarily limited the 
job creation capacities of Ukrainian enterprises and forced them to rationalise the 
use of labour. As a result, by the end of 1999, the number of employed was re-
duced to 20 million people (a reduction of almost 13% compared to 1998). Al-
though there was no regular assessment of poverty during the first five years of 
independence, a World Bank study in 1996 revealed that at the end of the 1992-





2.2.  Financial markets 
 
Financial markets play a growing role in economic development all over the 
world. They are also employed in a growing number of areas, including pension 
systems. Although financial markets do not provide any direct solution to the fi-
nancial problems of pension systems, they can contribute to bringing pension sys-
tems back to sustainability. They impose, almost by definition, that PV(B)=PV(C). 
The same can be achieved without financial markets but that is spread over coun-
tries to a much smaller extent.
10 
                                                 
8 Only about 6% of the population of Ukraine lived below the national poverty level of 75 
rubles in 1980. 
9 There is an on-going debate about the adequacy and comparability of the national pover-
ty levels across the time, however we present this measure because it seems more con-
sistent with the pre-transition USSR measures then the World Bank indicators that were 
calculated for Ukraine only after the independence. 
10 Latvia, Poland, Sweden and to some extent in Italy are among European countries in 
which non-financial solutions have been implemented (together with the financial ones or 
not). PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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Financial markets, if employed within the pension system, can also contribute 
to additional economic goals (stronger growth) via a number of positive external-
ities they create (an increase in savings, financial market developments and public 
education). Using financial markets is a well known method of reforming pension 
systems. This method has advantages and disadvantages that are widely discussed 
in economic literature. Nevertheless, financial markets will most likely be used for 
pension reforms in both Russia and Ukraine. Therefore it is necessary to discuss 
issues related to financial markets but only to the extent that this discussion con-
tributes to pension reforms and the impact that financial markets can have on la-
bour markets and restructuring in both countries analyzed. 
 
2.2.1.  Russia 
 
Russia is a country with emerging financial markets characterized by high and 
growing profitability but also by high volatility and riskiness. As financial markets 
were closed for foreign financial organization, many small domestic financial in-
stitutions were founded. Even by January 1, 2007, there were 1,345 commercial 
banks, 918 insurance companies, and 289 private pension funds in Russia.  
Private pension funds are non-profit organizations founded exclusively for the 
purposes of pension savings. They can be either voluntary or mandatory, as they 
have been in Russia since 2004. Most voluntary pension accounts are opened by 
employers in favor of their employees; individual pension savings are still un-
common. Private pension funds remain small players on financial markets. By 
January 1, 2007 their reserves reached 1.5% of Russia’s GDP; the number of par-
ticipants comprised 9.3% of the total employed population, while the number of 
private pension recipients formed only 2.3% of all pensioners in Russia (Table 6).  
The two years before the crisis of 2008 were very successful in terms of the 
development of financial markets in the country. 2006 became the year in which 
the banking sector developed most rapidly in the last 8 years. Bank assets have 
increased by more than 32% in real terms, and capital has increased by 23.7%. As 
a result, by the end of the year, bank assets reached 53% of GDP and capital 
reached 5% of the GDP of 2006 [DC 2007]. The stock market has also developed 
very rapidly and by the end of 2006 its capitalization reached more than 25 trillion 
rubles (about 94% of GDP) [DC 2007]. All indices demonstrated significant 
growth: in 2006 the RTS (Russian Trading System) index increased by 71% (83% 
in 2005), RTS-2 index– by 42% (69% in 2005), MMVB (Moscow Interbank Cur-
rency Exchange – MICEX) index – by 92% (63% in 2005) [DC 2007]. Stocks of 
oil- and gas-companies, power industry companies, banks and communication 
companies were in the greatest demand. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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On the contrary, the volumes of debt markets are rather limited. Even in the 
highly successful year of 2006, when the currency market was liberalized, the 
capacity of federal, municipal and corporate debt reached 2 trillion rubles (near 
7.5% of GDP) [DC 2007]. But the general trend until the ongoing crisis was a 
decline in the volumes of public debt markets (from almost 20% of GDP in 1997-
1998 to less than 4% in 2006) because of the constant surplus of the federal 
budget. 
Mandatory pension savings can be invested in a very limited number of securi-
ties and it is prohibited to invest them abroad. Moreover, most pension reform 
participants have chosen the most conservative strategy of investing their money – 
through a public managing company, which was allowed to invest in deposits and 
state securities only until 2009. As a result, pension funds are placing increasing 
pressure on the domestic debt market.  
This problem cannot be solved immediately because sociological surveys dem-
onstrate the population’s substantial distrust of the idea of pension savings. Focus-
groups on pension reform conducted in 2006 show a remaining negative effect of 
the failed voucher privatization
11 and the collapse of financial pyramids in the first 
half of the 1990s, which led to a lack of trust towards either state or business and 
reduced trust in financial institutions and long-term savings. Besides, pension re-
form is not popularised, and there is no information campaign to overcome this 
distrust at present. Furthermore, due to the high volatility of the securities market, 
private managing companies sometimes show worse results compared to the state 
managing company – Vnesheconombank. 
 
2.2.2.  Ukraine 
 
Similar to Russia, commercial banking forms the largest part of the financial 
sector in the country, while other financial institutions play a small role in the sec-
tor [GOLODNIUK 2005]. In 2005, insurance companies constituted only about 
7% of the financial market, and credit unions were about 0.3% [GOLODNIUK 
2006]. The assets of investment companies in Ukraine were only about 0.25% of 
GDP in 2005 (including pension funds). At the beginning of 2006, 58 non-
government pension funds were registered in Ukraine
12 [MLSP, PFU 2005]. These 
funds worked with about 88 thousand clients, and their total assets were about 42 
mln. UAH (less than 0.01% of GDP in 2005). Over 70% of the pension fund’s 
                                                 
11 Many investment companies that dealt with vouchers have either disappeared or gone 
bankrupt. 
12 44 of these funds are open funds, 9 are corporate, and 5 are professional (union) funds. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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assets were invested in bank deposits, and only about 17% invested into the stocks 
and bonds of Ukrainian enterprises (Table 7).  
In recent years, the financial market in Ukraine has been growing rapidly. From 
2000 to 2005, the growth rate reached 500% [GOLODNIUK 2006]. However, the 
growth and effectiveness of pension funds in Ukraine are limited by the develop-
ment of the stock market. According to the estimates of the State Committee for 
Stocks and the Stock Exchange, only 4% of stock trade was conducted at the offi-
cial exchanges in 2004, and the rest was conducted outside the market. By the end 
of 2005, the Ukrainian stock market consisted of eight stock exchanges and two 
trade systems. The largest entity was the First Stock Trade System (PFTS), which 
conducted over 84% of all trades on the market. The stock market in Ukraine con-
tinued growing, reaching a capitalization about $77 bln. in the middle of 2007. 
The number of stock exchanges increased to a dozen, but the market operations 
centralized further, with about 95% of operations executed at PFTS (see Zelenyuk 
2007). However, market capitalization remains low, reaching only $1,650 per 
capita. The stock market is also suffering from low liquidity and plays a marginal 
role in the trade of stocks and the determination of the real stock price. Most of the 
stock and enterprise property rights transfer transactions remain outside the stock 
market and at prices that do not necessarily reflect the stock price at the stock ex-
changes.  
Experts suggest that there are three major factors preventing the development 
of a stronger stock market. The first is property rights protection, especially pro-
tection of the rights of minority owners. Similar to most CIS countries, capital 
market legislation in Ukraine was developed with the help of international advi-
sors, primarily from the USA. Although de-jure legal protection of shareholders in 
the country is close to US standards, de-facto the minority shareholders are almost 
unprotected [GOLODNIUK 2005]. As a result, there are significant risks in own-
ing less than a blocking share of an enterprise, which reduces interest in the trade 
of small shares of enterprises. The second factor is the lack development of market 
infrastructure and the existence of a number of small exchanges and a depositary. 
The third factor is the too slow improvement in market regulations, especially the 
increased coordination between the two existing regulators on the market. 
Underdeveloped domestic capital markets are one of the reasons that Ukrainian 
enterprises borrow outside the country. While State Foreign Debt decreased almost 
50% during the period of 2003-2007 (from about 21.6% of GDP to 10.7% of 
GDP) (see NBU 2007), the gross foreign debt of the country increased from 47% 
of GDP to 59% of GPD over the same period. According to analysts and govern-
ment officials, the primary reason for an increase in the foreign debt of Ukraine is 
the attraction of foreign lending by enterprises to finance investment projects and 
imports.  Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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For a long time, one of the largest segments of financial markets in Ukraine 
was government debt. A large consolidated budget deficit at the beginning of the 
transition forced the government to borrow significant amounts of money, with 
public debt reaching over 30% of GDP in 2000. Since during that period borrow-
ing large amounts of money on external markets was impossible, most of these 
amounts were borrowed on internal markets using short-term government obliga-
tions. However, when the economy of Ukraine and the government managed to 
control the budget deficit, the public debt was significantly decreased. It went 
down from 31% of GDP in 2002 to 23% of GDP in 2004. Large proceedings from 
privatization and re-privatization, including the Kryvorigstal re-privatization, al-
lowed for a further reduction of the debt to 16% in 2005. In addition, favorable 
credit ratings allowed the government to restructure the debt and replace short-
term internal obligations with longer-term external borrowings. The trend of re-
ducing the public debt continued in 2006. However, increased social spending in 
2006-2007, and the expected further increase in budget expenditures in 2008, led 
to expectations of an increase in the budget deficit in the following years. This 
increased deficit would lead to a new public debt increase, and, possibly, to a new 
wave of government debt papers on internal financial markets. Despite the gov-
ernment’s intentions to decrease external state debt, in nominal figures the debt 
increased from 8.5 to 10 bln USD during the period of 2003-2007. At the same 
time, State Foreign Debt significantly decreased as a percent of GDP due to the 
significant rate of GDP growth and the weakening of the dollar. 
Insufficient development of the financial markets in Ukraine became an obsta-
cle to the introduction of the second and the third tier of the pension system. A 
potential solution would have been to use the investment instruments that are 
available on financial markets abroad. However, the current law does not allow 
investing pension funds abroad. 
 
 
2.3.  Demographic issues 
 
2.3.1.  Russia 
 
Until the end of 1980s, Russia experienced positive population growth. But 
from 1989 to 2002, the population decreased from 147 mln people to 145.2 mln, 
despite the net-immigration observed in the 1990s. In 2009, there were 141.9 mln 
people in Russia. There are two reasons for this trend – extremely low life expec-
tancy and a low fertility rate. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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It does not look like the situation will reverse in the future. Even according to 
the very optimistic average scenario of the official population forecast that as-
sumes both fertility and life expectancy will grow at a steady rate for the entire 
projected period,
13 the Russian population will decrease by 139 mln people by 
2031.  
Low and decreasing longevity remains the most significant feature of the 
demographic development of Russia during the last 40 years (Table 9). The situa-
tion has slightly changed since 2005 with life expectancy at birth for both sexes 
increasing from 65.27 in 2004 to 67.88 in 2008. In 2008, life expectancy at birth 
was 61.83 years for men and 74.16 years for women, which is still much less than 
in other European countries. As projected by the statistical office, it could reach 
68.1 years for men and 78.2 years for women at birth by 2030 [Rosstat 2009]
14.  
The extremely low and declining level of male life expectancy is mainly caused 
by the premature deaths of Russian middle-aged men [Shkolnikov et al, 1998]. In 
2005, men surviving until the age of 60 could expect to live on average 13.2 years 
more, and women 19 years more. Early mortality, much higher for the male popu-
lation, influences the gender structure of people of pension ages. There are more 
women of retirement age than men: there were only 28% of males among all peo-
ple of retirement age in 2006. These negative life expectancy trends constitute a 
barrier to raising pension ages, at least for men. First, it is difficult for politicians 
to explain the necessity of such increases at a time when male life expectancy at 
birth almost equals the official pension age. Secondly, low life expectancy corre-
lates with poor health and disability and therefore pension age increases could lead 
to the expansion of the number of disabled people. 
Fertility rates influence both the number and age structure of population. Rus-
sia experienced a dramatic decrease in fertility rates in the beginning of 1930s 
[Vishnevsky, 2006]. Since the mid-1960s until the end of the 1980s, the total fer-
tility rate was around 2 children per woman, but from 1993 until 2006, the total 
fertility rate did not exceeded 1.3. It increased to 1.4 and 1.5 in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively, in response to the new pronatalist family policy measures introduced 
in 2007. According to the official forecast, it will increase in the future but it will 
be difficult to reach 1980 levels. 
                                                 
13 In 2008 in Russia TFR reached the unprecedented level of 1.494 but the average scena-
rio of the official population projection assumes that TFR will be 1.530 in 2009 and 1.704 
in 2030. Life expectancy in 2008 was 67.88 for both sexes, and is assumed to be 68.00 in 
2009 and 73.3 in 2030. 
14 The recently adopted Program of Long-Term Demographic Development (2008) sets life 
expectancy at birth of 75 years old for both men and women by 2025, used by Rosstat in 
its high (“optimistic”) scenario of the forecast, but from the current perspective it does not 
seem realistic. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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In the first half of the decade of the 2000s, Russia enjoyed a period of ‘demo-
graphic dividends’ due to the relatively small cohorts of elderly people born in the 
1940s and earlier, and the large cohorts born in the 1980s, an echo of the baby-
boom caused by the generous Soviet family policies at that time [UNDP, 2009] 
(Table 10). But long-term demographic forecasts show that Russia will face a 
rapid ageing in the future (Figure 2). The share of seniors (people who have 
reached the official pension age), will increase from 346 elderly people per 1000 
active people in 2000 up to 623 or 747 per 1000 in 2050 according to different 
probability forecasting scenarios [Vishnevskiy et al., 2004]
15. Unlike the situation 
in many other countries, the population of Russia is ageing now exclusively due to 
declining fertility rates. Population projections show that the speed of ageing in 
Russia will depend on its success in increasing fertility and longevity. From the 
ageing perspective, the “best” case scenario includes increasing fertility rates and a 
stable high and early mortality, while the “worst” case scenario is consistently low 
fertility rates but improved longevity (Table 11). These demographic trends have 
put major pressure on the financial viability of the Russian pension system.  
 
Figure 2. Dynamics of demographic old-age dependency ratio (people aged 65 years 
and more per 1000 people of 15-64 years old)  in Russia, Ukraine and some other 
countries, by mid of the year, 2000-2090 
 
Source: World Bank, Health, Nutrition and Population Summary Profile, Demographic 
Projections http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats/dp1.asp. 
                                                 
15 Recent official population studies give high (optimistic), average and low scenario pro-
jections. Respectively, they predict that by 2031, per 1000 people who are of active ages 
(16 – 59 for men and 16 – 54 for women), there will be 527 (high), 520 (average) or 498 
(low) people of pension age (60+ for men and 55+ for women) [Rosstat 2009]. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 91  25 
2.3.2.  Ukraine 
 
Ukraine has experienced massive population decline since independence. Due 
to an increased death rate, decreased birth rate, and large emigration, the popula-
tion decreased from 52 million in 1991 to 46.0 million in 2009 (see Table 5).  
The downward population dynamics in Ukraine are a result of a twofold prob-
lem: falling birth rates and increasing death rates. Both indicators started worsen-
ing in the late 1980s, partially due to the deterioration of the quality of health care, 
and partially due to the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster. In the 1990s, the 
number of births decreased substantially: the TFR fell from 1.92 in 1989 to 1.09 in 
2001. In the first decade of the 2000s, the situation slightly improved (TFR was 
1.21 in 2005 and 1.32 in 2006-2007), but fertility remained far below the level of 
simple reproduction and even lower than in Russia. During this period, the number 
of deaths increased by one fifth (758.1 thousand people in 2000 versus 629.6 thou-
sand people in 1990). At the same time, the death rates are more than twice as high 
as the birth rates in Ukraine. This fact is often partially attributed to the deteriora-
tion of the healthcare system in the country which occurred during the economic 
crisis period at the end of the 20
th century.  
Similarly to Russia, life expectancy in Ukraine was falling over the same pe-
riod (Table 9). During 1990-2000, life expectancy at birth decreased from 70.7 
years to 67.9 years (by 2.8 years). The decrease in life expectancy was especially 
significant for the male population. During the 1990s, the expected duration of life 
diminished by 3.5 years for men, while female life expectancy decreased only by 
0.9 years.  
According to the data of the All-Ukrainian Population Census in 2001, women 
constituted 53.7% of the total population. In 2001, there were 1159 women per 
1000 men in Ukraine compared to 1163 women per 1000 men in 1989, when the 
previous census was conducted. The ratio of females to males of reproductive age 
is improving as well. In 2001 there were 1031 females per 1000 males aged be-
tween 20-49 years old. Nevertheless, the shortened life expectancy of men signifi-
cantly impacted the gender structure of the pension-age population. The majority 
of the population over 70 years old consists of females.  
The population structure by age has also changed. Although the proportion of 
people of working age (considered to be from 15 to 70 years old) did not change, 
the proportion of younger people decreased, while the share of elderly people 
(60+) increased slightly. At the same time, the system support ratio (the ratio of 
workers to pensioners) has changed more substantially than the demographic sup-
port ratio because of two reasons. First, although most pensioners that were able to 
work had to look for a job to supplement their pension income, the general em-Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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ployment ratio decreased during the period of transition. At the same time, the 
proportion of pensioners in the total population grew from 25% in 1991 to 30% of 
the total population in 2005 not only because of demographic trends but also due 
to the diminishing actual pension age. As the result, the system support ratio sig-
nificantly decreased, reaching a record low of 1.38 workers per pensioner in 1999-
2000 (Table 5). 
A significant contributor to the decrease in the population of Ukraine is migra-
tion. According to official data, during 1994-2001, migration
16 led to a 18.6% 
reduction of the population of Ukraine. Ukrainians used to leave their homeland 
primarily for CIS countries (mostly Russia), and some other foreign countries 
(USA, Canada, Israel, etc). Permanent migration is supplemented by temporary 
labour migration, which significantly contributes to the decreasing support ratio. 
According to the estimates of the State Migrations’ Committee of Ukraine, at least 
5 million people (one fifth of the working-age population of Ukraine) are working 
abroad.
17 Due to the unregulated nature of these migrant workers, they did not 
provide any contributions to the pension system in Ukraine or other countries, 
which increases problems in funding the current pension system and raises con-
cerns for the pensions of these people in the future.  
The negative trends of population decline and aging are expected to continue 
into the future. According to the demographic forecasts constructed by the insti-
tutes of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, the population of Ukraine 
can reach as low as 24 mln people by the year 2050, although the most realistic 
estimates suggest that this number will be over 30 mln (see Table 12). The pri-
mary reason for the continuation of the decrease of the Ukrainian population is the 
current significant gap between birth and death rates, the decreasing number of 
people of child-bearing age during the last 10 years and worsening fertility rates. 
Consequently, the share of the working-age population will decline, and the pro-
portion of people over 65 years old to the working-age (15-64 y.o.) population will 
increase by about 60% compared to the same ratio in 2005 (Table 12, see also 
Figure 2).  
Provided the inevitability of the depopulation in Ukraine, some experts propose 
that the Government of Ukraine liberalise its migration policy with respect to the 
countries of the Asia and Africa regions. More liberal migration policies could 
help in reviving the upward birth dynamics, fighting the problem of both popula-
tion ageing and the falling dependency ratio in Ukraine. According to estimates, in 
this case the total population will stop falling in 2025 after having reached about 
                                                 
16 Here the cumulative volume of net migrations was compared to the corresponding re-
duction of population in Ukraine over 1994-2001. 
17 Press release of State Migrations’ Committee of Ukraine dated of April 2, 2003. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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43 million people. Only within the next 50 years would it be possible to stimulate 
a considerable inflow of migrants to Ukraine, thanks to which the number of 
Ukrainians could reach 51.5 million people by 2075. 
To sum up, the economic crisis of the 1990s was more profound in Ukraine 
than in Russia. Economic recovery in the beginning of the 2000s was also more 
evident in Russia: in 2005 in Russia, the GDP reached 90.6% of pre-reform levels 
(1990), while in Ukraine it only reached 62.6%. But the nature of this growth was 
more risky in Russia than in Ukraine. In the former, economic growth was mostly 
a result of extremely high and growing energy prices, the major source of Russian 
export. Although Ukraine was also significantly dependant on the large demand 
for steel, its economic recovery was more diversified and based on production 
growth.  
At the same time, even now, fiscal policy remains better in Russia than in 
Ukraine. The latter has a larger budget deficit and a more substantial deficit in the 
pension system, while the former had seven years of budget surplus and rather 
stable pension expenditures. A dangerous sign is that the difference between the 
two countries has been vanishing over the last two years when Russia increased its 
pension expenditures disproportionally to pension incomes in the period of federal 
budget deficit provoked by the ongoing crisis. But still Russia has lower budget 
expenditures than Ukraine in relation to GDP. 
Financial markets are more developed in Russia than in Ukraine but in both 
countries they remain risky and volatile and highly dependant on the international 
market situation. The capacities of the internal securities markets are limited. 
The permanent external factor influencing the pension system is population 
ageing; it does not seem serious today, but will soon begin to accelerate rapidly. 
Both countries have a very similar population structure and suffer from the same 
demographic problems of low fertility and early and high mortality. But given that 
Ukraine has slightly better rates of life expectancy than Russia, it has a greater 
number of elderly people. 
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3. Pension System and Reforms in 
Russia and Ukraine 
The previous chapter demonstrated that over the last twenty years, the demo-
graphic situation continued to worsen in Russia and Ukraine while economic con-
ditions changed significantly. These changes put constraints on the sustainability 
and development of pension systems. The Soviet-type pension system and level of 
pension benefits were unsustainable and both countries implemented significant 
pension reforms at the beginning of the 21st century. This chapter describes the 
changes in pension systems and lessons learned during the reform process. 
 
 
3.1.  The common past 
 
Both countries were developed as republics of the USSR and had many things 
in common, including their social insurance system. Social insurance (pensions, 
sick leaves, disability insurance) covered only people employed in state firms and 
organizations or collective farms. The primary goal of the system was to maintain 
a certain level of family per-capita income by supplementing wages. Due to the 
uniformity of income, almost the entire working population was eligible for ser-
vices provided by the system. However, people who where un-employed, self-
employed or working at private firms (which became possible in 1987) were ex-
cluded from both public social insurance and social assistance. Besides, people 
working at different state firms received unequal packages of social services. And 
even at the same organization, those with greater seniority had better access to 
better quality services. 
The pension provision established by 1956 and 1965 laws
18, also covered only 
people employed at public enterprises or collective farms. The system was charac-
terized by strong paternalism, low costs for employers (4-12% of payroll depend-
ing on the sector), a low retirement age (60 years for men and 55 years for 
                                                 
18 1956 Law on state pensions for wage- and salary-earners; 1965 Law on state pensions 
for collective farmers. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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women
19) and special preferences for certain groups of people not directly related 
to their employment records (seniority and wage).  
The public pension system was based on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and defined-
benefit (DB) principles. Females with at least 20 years of seniority and males with 
at least 25 years of seniority could enter retirement with full old-age benefits once 
they reached the normal retirement age. These conditions had to provide an old 
age replacement rate of 55% of the average individual salary for the last one or 
any best five years of service. Each additional year of work increased the pension 
by 1% up to 75% of the salary. However, maximum benefit could not be higher 
than 2.5 minimum pension benefits. Certain groups of employees working in so 
called “hazardous conditions” could retire 5 to 10 years earlier. There were no 
additional contributions for these types of pensions, and the government used early 
retirement options as an instrument of its employment policy aimed at attracting 
people to certain jobs.  
Pensions were administered by social security offices. There were no additional 
private or occupational pensions. Public pension benefits were low and weakly 
correlated to previous employment history. The pension benefits of collective 
farmers were always lower than the pension benefits of workers. Benefits were not 
indexed at all which caused inequality between “new” and “old” pensioners and 
high poverty risks among the elderly in the USSR [Baskakov & Baskakova 1998].  
Overall, the pension system had a lack of transparency and was not effective; 
more than half of the pension expenditures were covered by budget revenues. At-
tempts to reform the system, aimed at strengthening the link between employment 
records and pension benefits as well as at the elimination of inequalities between 
“old” and “new”, urban and rural pensioners, were made since the early 1980s but 
were unsuccessful. Finally, in the beginning of 1990s, each of the Soviet republics, 
including Russia and Ukraine, adopted their own pension legislation. 
 
 
3.2.  Deterioration of post-Soviet arrangements in the 1990s 
 
3.2.1.  Russia 
 
In 1991, Russia introduced its own mandatory public pension system, which 
preserved most of the features of its Soviet predecessor.
20 The new pension system 
                                                 
19 The pension age was established in the beginning of 1930s for industrial workers and 
was not changed from that time. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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covered the whole population regardless of employment experience and type of 
employment. It removed discrimination against people employed at private firms 
and own-account workers, eliminated differences in pension provision for urban 
and rural workers and supplied social pensions for those who never worked. The 
system protected against a wide range of risks and offered the following types of 
labor pensions related to certain employment records and reasons of retirement: 
old-age pensions, pensions for long seniority (granted for certain groups of work-
ers at lower retirement ages), disability pensions, and survival pensions.  
The pension formula did not change significantly except in the extended defini-
tion of seniority covering not only periods of paid employment or individual en-
trepreneurship but also periods of unemployment, vocational education, military 
service, paid maternity leave, etc. The difference between minimum and maximum 
benefits was increased up to 3 times. Besides, mechanisms of the pension benefits 
indexation according to the inflation were introduced.  
Employees and employers were obliged to pay contributions into the off-
budget Pension Fund of the Russian Federation founded in 1990, from which the 
pensions were drawn. The enlarged coverage of the pension system together with a 
federal budget deficit required an increase in contributions. Throughout the 1990s, 
the contribution rate to the pension system was 29%, including 28% paid by the 
employer
21 in favor of the employee and 1% paid by the employee him or herself.  
Although a general framework of the pension system remained unchanged until 
2002, many regulations became inadequate a year after its adoption when price 
liberalization and major economic reforms started. The pension system was not 
flexible enough to respond to new economic challenges and fell into a long period 
of financial instability. It is important to underline, that contrary to Ukraine, for 
the whole period of transition until 2009, the Russian government obviously tried 
to keep pension expenditures at nearly the same and rather low levels – between 5 
to 6% of GDP, regardless of the economic situation (Table 1). Nevertheless, even 
this very inexpensive system was unsustainable during almost the whole period of 
economic transformation. The Pension Fund was in deficit from 1995 until 1999. 
This was caused, on the one hand, by a fall in formal employment and wide-
spread wage, tax and pension contribution arrears resulting in a decline in incomes 
in the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation (PFR). Contribution and tax com-
pliance were at very low levels: the effective contribution rate was only 18% in the 
mid-90s [Yaremenko 1998]. On the other hand, the state relaxed the eligibility 
criteria for early retirement, old-age pensions, and disability even more in order to 
                                                                                                                           
20 Law on “state pensions in the Russian Federation” (Nov.-20, 1990) [further in the text – 
Law of 1990]. 
21 Special professional groups as farmers or self-employed people paid less. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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compensate for the negative effects of unemployment
22 and the sharp drop in real 
wages [Sinyavskaya 2001; for disability see Maleva et al, 1999]. Thus, a system 
support ratio, reflected in the number of pensioners per one employed person, is 
much worse compared to the demographic support ratio (Figure 3). 
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The indexations of pension benefits was irregular and to a lesser degree than 
inflation. In 1993 in order to reduce poverty among pensioners, compensation 
benefits were introduced in addition to irregular indexation. The higher the pen-
sion benefit, the less compensation was received on this pension. This measure 
reduced the differentiation of benefits and weakened the links between pensions 
and wages but required less money than indexation. The replacement ratio
23 was 
supported at very low levels compared to other countries (Table 13). This indicator 
grew moderately only in the mid-1990s when pension benefits increased faster 
than wages. However, from 2003 onwards, it was below 30%. 
The expansion of pension arrears was another consequence of the insustainabil-
ity of the pension system. Since its evolution in 1995, pension arrears achieved 
12% of PFR incomes by 1997, sharply increased again after the 1998 crisis, and 
completely paid up only in 2000. Therefore, in the second half of the 1990s, pen-
                                                 
22 In the beginning of 1990s, there was a strong fear of mass unemployment expressed by 
politicians, experts, and society; to mitigate its anticipated negative consequences several 
new grounds for early retirement for work in hazardous conditions and pensions for 
unemployed people of pre-retirement ages were introduced in 1991-1992. 
23 Replacement rate here indicates the ratio of the average pension to the average wage in 
the economy. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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sioners received even less from the PFR than is shown in official statistics of pen-
sion benefits and sometimes they received nothing.  
In the second half of the 1990s, the government reacted to the evident crisis in 
the pension system with a rationalization of pension regulation:  
•  In 1998, a new benefit formula24 was introduced as an attempt to estab-
lish closer links between wage, seniority and benefits. According to the 
new rules, there were no direct limits on benefit size but only insurance 
periods of the whole length of service were taken into account. The size 
of benefits was regulated indirectly via limits on the ratio of the individ-
ual wage/salary taken into account in the benefit formula. This ratio was 
equal to 80% of the average-economy wage in 1998 and 120% in 2001. 
There was no higher form of compensation. 
•  From 1998 to 2001, an attempt to limit the employment of pensioners 
was made. Pensioners getting benefits calculated on the new rules were 
not permitted to work. Thus, the choice was either to receive a smaller 
amount of pension benefit and continue working or to get a higher 
amount of pension benefit and leave the formal labor market. The analy-
sis shows that many pensioners preferred to leave formal employment 
[Sinyavskaya 2006]. 
As a result, contrary to other post-socialist economies, Russian pensioners suf-
fered more from the reforms. Real pension remained below its pre-reform levels 
(slightly more than 80% of the level of 1990 in 2008). The average pension was a 
little higher than a pensioner’s subsistence minimum in 1992-8, dropped far below 
this level in 1999 and was restored again to a subsistence minimum in 2002. How-
ever there were pensioners receiving pensions which were below the official sub-
sistence minimum (Table 13). Nevertheless, pensioners have lower risks of being 
in poverty compared to families with children. According to the official statistics, 
in 2004 there were only 12.4% of pensioners with incomes below subsistence 
minimum, while for the whole population, the poverty level was 17.6% [Rosstat 
2006] (see also Table 14 for poverty levels of households with or without pension-
ers based on the NOBUS survey).  
The real poverty of pensioners may be higher than official figures for two rea-
sons. First, the official poverty level is based on the subsistence minimum, which 
is lower for people of pension age (55 for women and 60 for men) because it is 
assumed that consumption decreases when people reach pension age, when in fact, 
it happens at least five or more years later. When calculated by the adult subsis-
                                                 
24 From 1998 to 2001, two benefit formulas, the old one introduced in 1990, and a new 
one, introduced in 1998, existed simultaneously. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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tence minimum, the poverty level of pensioners could be higher. Second, in order 
to prevent poverty among pensioners, the latter were allowed to work while re-
ceiving pensions. In the 1990s, about 20-30% of pensioners had jobs. Assessments 
of the poverty of pensioners based on 2003 data demonstrate that if the pensioners’ 
employment was restricted, the poverty level measured by money income would 
be 18% higher and the poverty level measured by disposable resources would be 
7% higher (Table 14).  
 
 
3.3.  Empirical section related to the past/present situation 
 
3.3.1.  Factors influencing the probability to work on pension in Russia 
 
Data and Methods 
To assess the correlations between pension system and labour supply we ad-
dressed the issue of the determinants of pensioners’ employment in Russia. The 
data used come from Wave 1 of the Gender and Generation Survey (GGS) carried 
out in Russia in 2004 (RusGGS)
25. The survey, coordinated by the Population 
Activity Unit of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, examines 
determining factors for individual demographic behaviour with a focus on inter-
generational and gender relations. It is a multidisciplinary survey, covering eco-
nomic, sociological and psychological factors [Vikat et al., 2007]. In addition to 
its retrospective view of behaviour, the survey includes a prospective approach 
and for that reason it will comprise three waves.  
The questionnaire was designed by an international group of researchers, and 
each country was supposed to use the standard questionnaire
26. The GGS ques-
tionnaire contains the information about the employment of the respondent and 
                                                 
25 The Russian GGS was conducted by the Independent Institute of Social Policy (Mos-
cow) with the financial support of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation and the 
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Germany. The  design and standard survey instruments  of the 
GGS were adjusted to the Russian context by the Independent Institute of Social Policy 
(Moscow) and the Demoscope Independent Research Center (Moscow) in collaboration 
with the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Rostock, Germany). 
26 The first stage of the Program is national survey based on standard questionnaire, which 
is unified for all countries and developed by GGS Consortium’s working group. Question-
naire text and interviewer’s instructions are available on the web site of UNECE: 
http://www.unece.org/ead/pau/ggp/ggs_quest.htm. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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his/her partner, and collects information about the social and economic features of 
the respondent and his/her partner and household members. 
The Russian survey is based on the multi-stage probability selection of dwell-
ing-units from which a relevant household was chosen, and finally a respondent 
was randomly selected from the household. The sampling size was 11,261 respon-
dents aged from 18 to 79 years. 
For the purpose of the current research, we selected pensioners for old-age and 
for long service (like coalminers, teachers, etc.) of 45+ years old.  Those who have 
disability and receive old-age pension are also in the sample. We excluded people 
employed in the army and police. Models were developed only for pensioners who 
had a job at the time of applying for pension.  
If a person left his or her job after becoming a pensioner at least once, s/he was 
defined as retired. If someone was retired, his/her job characteristics were the char-
acteristics of the last job held. If someone was not retired at the time of the interview 
(censored data), then his/her job characteristics were those of the current job.  
The descriptive statistics are in Table 16. 
We used two types of models. In the first stage we estimated the probability of 
staying employed by all pensioners who had work at the time of applying for a 
pension using a probit-model. The dependent variable was the pensioner’s em-
ployment measured as whether or not the person worked at least one month after 
becoming a pensioner. Two specifications tested the effect of the early retirement 
rights on this decision. In the first specification, we only checked the influence of 
having the right to early retirement on the probability of employment. In the sec-
ond specification we tested the effects of different early retirement programs. 
Those who had left their jobs during the first month of being pensioners were 
defined as not employed. The event was equal to 1 if a pensioner was employed at 
least 1 month. Next, we used survival models estimating the duration of employ-
ment of pensioners in months. Given that we had no a priori assumptions about the 
parametric form of the function describing the exit from the labour market, we 
applied the exponential AFT model. We did the analysis for both sexes and for 




The results are presented in Table 17 and 19. With regard to demographic vari-
ables (sex and age), we observed no significant effect of them on the probability to 
                                                 
27 We do not provide technical details of the models in the paper. Those who are interested 
can contact the authors. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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work at least one month after becoming a pensioner. But both are significant to the 
duration of employment. Female pensioners tended to leave the labor market more 
quickly than males. The older the pensioner, the fewer months he/she worked and 
this effect was especially large for men. As expected, we observed significant 
effects of higher levels of education on the probability of having a job after be-
coming a pensioner, especially for people with a higher education. The strong 
positive effect of having a higher education was the greatest for women. We also 
confirmed the negative effect of poor health on a pensioner’s employment. As the 
results for the other control variables (household structure, settlement and regional 
characteristics) were very standard, they are not discussed here. 
The models show that the characteristics of the job where a person worked be-
fore s/he became a pensioner were significant predictors of her/his further em-
ployment (while on pension). The most important was found to be the sector. Em-
ployment in education, health care, science and culture had the most significant 
positive effect on both the probability to keep a job while on pension and the dura-
tion of employment while being a pensioner. On the contrary, those employed in 
agriculture, compared to health care, education, etc., were the least likely to work 
while on pension and had the shortest period of employment. This confirms previ-
ous evidence suggesting that people in rural areas often retire so that they can 
work informally on their subsistence plots.  People also tend to retire quickly from 
construction and transport which may reflect the rather difficult working condi-
tions in these sectors.  
The effect of a person’s occupation was less clear. It was significant when 
taken alone but when we controlled for the sector, the difference between occupa-
tions diminished. Compared to machine operators, those employed as unskilled 
labour or specialists had a significantly higher probability of keeping their jobs. 
Men were also more likely keep their jobs if they were professionals. But for 
women, when controlling for the sector, this was not true. For them, the sector is 
more important: if a woman was a health care or education professional, she was 
likely to keep her job, but if she was in the same occupational group in industry 
then she was less likely to keep her job.  
Another important factor that adds to our understanding of the employment of 
pensioners is their right to early retirement according to the legislation. The effect 
of this variable confirms our previous suggestion that those who retire earlier do 
not lose their ability to work and this policy option serves for other goals. Entitle-
ment to early retirement schemes increases both the probability of employment 
and the period of employment of pensioners. This positive effect is especially im-
portant and large for employment in the Far North regions where workers have the 
right to retire earlier regardless of their real job conditions. The right to retire ear-
lier for teachers and rural health care workers does not affect the probability of Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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employment but increases the period of employment. To the contrary, people who 
retired earlier because their previous employment was in difficult conditions (so 
called list number 2 according to the legislation) are more likely to keep working 
compared to those who retired in line with the general rules but leave their jobs 
quicker.  
 
3.3.2.  Ukraine 
 
Similar to other FSU countries, the pension program is the largest social secu-
rity program in Ukraine. It was the most severely hit by the decreasing tax base. 
Prior to the reform in 2003, the pension system of Ukraine was a “pay-as-you-go” 
(PAYG) system that provided pensions to retirees from the money collected from 
current workers. The pension program provided old-age pensions (about 80% of 
expenditures), disability pensions, survival, social, and service pensions. The gen-
eral old-age pensions were provided to women over 55 and men over 60, and spe-
cial pensions were provided to workers of certain professions (miners, for exam-
ple) at an earlier age depending on the number of years they had worked. The 
standard replacement rate (the pension as a percentage of wage) guaranteed by the 
system was 55% of the average wage before retirement, within the minimum and 
maximum limits. 
The social welfare system in Ukraine is suffering from similar problems that 
other transition countries in the region are facing. The social programs are poorly 
targeted, and provide large amounts of benefits to people who could stay out of 
poverty without benefits. Because of the large number of recipients and the limited 
economic resources, the programs (especially during the years of economic crises) 
were unable to provide adequate coverage, and the amount of social payments 
received by each participant was relatively small.  
The pension system accumulates and spends 7-14% of GDP in Ukraine. De-
spite being the largest expenditure item, due to the lack of funding during the cri-
sis period, pensions became only a valuable co-payment for working pensioners, 
and did not provide sufficient income on their own for people to stay out of pov-
erty [World Bank 2000]. In Ukraine the average pension was only 36% of the 
living wage in 2003, and this ration steadily increased to almost 47% in 2006. 
Surprisingly, the elderly population constitutes only 11% of all the poor in the 
country [World Bank 2000]. One of the reasons for this is that pensioners that are 
able to work supplement their pension income with part-time jobs, and the pen-
sions and subsidies received by pensioners are sufficient to keep most families 
with elderly members out of poverty.  PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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Given macroeconomic and population trends, such a generous (in terms of the 
replacement ratio and amount of various in-kind benefits), the pension program 
inherited by Ukraine from USSR could not be sustainable in the long run. In 1993 
the pension fund ran a deficit of 1% of GDP or about 10% of the pension fund 
expenditures, and had to be taken under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance 
that financed the deficit out of the state budget. The previously discussed tenden-
cies of the aging population of Ukraine created additional concerns about the long-
term financial sustainability of the solidarity pension system in Ukraine.  
Researchers expressed concerns especially because the system dependence ra-
tio (the ratio of beneficiaries to contributors) was gradually increasing. We can see 
that while there were approximately 2 workers per every pensioner in 1991, there 
were only 1.6 workers per pensioner in 1996, and the ratio was declining. In fact, 
researchers showed that the ratio of contributors to beneficiaries dropped further, 
reaching 1.15 contributors per pensioner [Riboud, Chu 1997]. C. Kane of the 
World Bank in his research in 1995 [Kane 1996] showed that if the current pen-
sion system was not reformed, the constant annual deficit of the system would rise 
to 3% of GDP (or 30% of expenditures). The researcher recommended that the 
pension age be increased to 65 for both males and females, and that the replace-
ment ratio should decrease.  
Another World Bank study by M. Riboud and H. Chu [1997] revealed that the 
concerns were correct. The pension system dependence ratio increased, and in 
order to maintain some balance in the pension fund, the replacement rate was de-
creased to about 1/3 of the average wage over the years since independence. This 
was achieved by indexations that lagged behind the inflation rate (decreasing real 
pensions) and by narrowing the gap between the minimum and maximum old-age 
pension. The authors showed that the pension system in these conditions could be 
sustainable only if moderate growth was achieved for the next decade. Any at-
tempt to increase the replacement ratio (increase pensions) would result in the 
pension fund deficit going from 3% of GDP in 2000 to 7% of GDP in 2010. They 
also said that pension reform relying on an increase in pension age to 65 years and 
a reduction of payroll taxes to 23% might create a pension system that would be 
sustainable in the long run. Finally, the researchers suggested that the introduction 
of a fully-funded multi-tier (mandatory and voluntary) pension system could re-
duce the economic cost of the pension system in the long-run.  
Thus, factors associated with the former Soviet pension system, ageing, and 
economic transition (e.g., sharp drop in real incomes due to inflation, increase in 
poverty rates) are the same for both Russia and Ukraine. The shortcomings of the 
pension system have almost remained the same since Soviet times until now. They 
include: Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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•  High rate of budget financing; 
•  Paternalism; exclusion of employees from directly contributing to their 
future pensions;  
•  Weak link between benefits and former employment records (seniority, 
wage, contributions); 
•  Inequality between different groups of pensioners not related to their 
contributions to the pension system; 
•  Low levels of pension benefits which force an increase in the incomes of 
the poorest and lead to low benefit differentiation; 
•  Effective pension age is even lower than the official one, which is still 
55 for women and 60 for men. 
The difference between Russia and Ukraine is that until the current financial 
crisis Russian government was able to keep pension expenditures at nearly the 
same rather low levels – between 5 and 6% of GDP. Russia has never experienced 




3.4.  Current situation: Attempts to create a new reality 
 
3.4.1.  Russia 
 
Proposals of the reform 
Attempts to create a new pension system started in the early 1990s, when the 
pension system started deteriorating under the new economic conditions. There are 
two major groups in the debates on the future of the pension system. The first 
group includes those who suppose that the instability in the pension sphere is no 
more than a result of economic volatility and the main efforts should be devoted to 
increasing the benefits of current pensioners. The second group includes support-
ers of radical changes in pension regulation who believe that the pension system of 
the 1990s was inadequate to both a market economy and future demographic 
trends and that the pension reform should be addressed mostly to future genera-
tions of pensioners. By 1995, almost all agreed that the present pension system 
had at least to be rationalized.  PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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The following pension reform proposals reflect the positions of each of the two 
sides depending on the predominance of its supporters in different periods of eco-
nomic transformation:  
•  The most conservative is the concept of the reform of the pension system 
of 1995 that assumed a rationalization of the current pension system only 
with an introduction of voluntary pensions (either occupational or indi-
vidual).  
•  The most radical is the proposal of the pension reform of 1997 devel-
oped by the Ministry of Labor and Social Development (M. Dmitriev). 
This proposal was inspired by the success of Chilean pension reform and 
corresponded most closely to the World Bank 1994 concept. After being 
presented in autumn of 1997, it was not supported by the government. 
•  A compromise between the conservative and the radical positions was 
reflected in the program of the pension reform of 1998, which assumed a 
gradual transition to defined-contribution principles, both funded and un-
funded (NDC). This program was adopted in May 1998 but the August 
1998 crisis prevented its realization, which was scheduled for 1999. 
•  In 2001-2002, new pension legislation was developed on the basis of the 
Program of 1998; the ideas of introducing a certain portion of funded fi-
nancing and smoothly transitioning to defined-contribution principles in 
financing PAYG labor pensions were preserved but were significantly 
modified (ownership rights; contributions of employees; modification of 
NDC, etc.). 
•  Finally, a new wave of substantial changes of pension legislation was 
initiated in 2007-2008. First of all, it included the substantial indexation 
of pension benefits in 2007-2009 and a re-estimation (so called “valori-
zation”) of pension rights acquired before 2002 and particularly before 
1991 in 2010. Given that the contributions to the pension system were 
not increased in the same proportion as benefits, the immediate outcome 
of these measures was a PFR deficit and its increased dependency on the 
federal budget transfers. Besides, the budget subsidizes voluntary pen-
sion savings paid by employees in addition to mandatory funded contri-
butions on the same accounts.  
All the proposals mentioned above offer a so-called “multi-tier” pension sys-
tem but the content and the importance of the first and second pillars are different 
and it is rarely the sort of multi-pillar reform as envisioned in the interpretation of 
the World Bank (Table 15). The last proposal does not change the pension system 
structure created by the 2002 reform but violates the basic principle of financial 
sustainability of the system.  Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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The pension reform implemented in January 2002 included the following pillars: 
•  1
ST PILLAR: a ‘basic’ part of labor pension for all pensioners plus the so 
called ‘public pension provision’, including social pensions for people 
without seniority; 
•  2
ND PILLAR: labor pensions, both defined-contributions PAYG (the ‘in-
surance’ part) and funded (‘funded’ part of labor pension); mandatory 
funded occupational pensions instead of PAYG privileged ones
28; 
•  3
RD PILLAR: voluntary occupational and individual private pensions. 
 
Pension reform of 2002 – basic features 
The reform of 2002 was officially aimed at strengthening the links between 
contributions and future pension benefits, the growth of real pensions, and achiev-
ing the financial sustainability of the pension system now and in the future. It was 
assumed that it would result in an increase in the supply of “long money” in the 
economy, a higher savings rate, and the formalization of the labor market. Finally, 
experts supposed that the introduction of a pension formula based on defined-
contribution principles and individual accounts would increase the transparency of 
the pension system and its political independence.  
The new system distinguished between two major types of mandatory pensions 
– labor pensions and pensions from ‘public pension provision’. In the former, 
benefits are earned through prior contributions over the entire working life. The 
latter are given to people who have no right for labor pensions or to some special 
occupational groups or categories of people (civil servants, disabled veterans, vic-
tims of Chernobyl and other man-caused catastrophes, their survivors, etc.) with-
out prior contributions. An individual can claim only one type of pension but 
sometimes s/he is permitted to receive a pension from the ‘public pension provi-
sion’ in addition to a labor pension (e.g., Great Patriotic War veterans or Cherno-
byl victims, federal officials, etc.). 
The tax reform of 2000 replaced contributions to the off-budget funds, includ-
ing the Pension Fund, and to the payroll tax called the Unified Social Tax (UST). 
Hence, according to law, labor pensions were financed through UST paid by em-
ployers only. The rates were differentiated by types of employer (e.g., individual 
entrepreneurs pay very small lump-sum contributions; agricultural firms pay UST 
at smaller rates) and by the annual wage level (in 2000-2004 there were four tax 
rates and in 2005-2009 there were three. The higher the wage of the employee, the 
                                                 
28 The law on mandatory professional pension schemes was to be enacted in 2003 but it 
has not been adopted yet. This component of reform is therefore postponed by fact. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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less was paid by his/her employer). Thus, the effective UST rate was lower than its 
maximum level, which was 28% of the payroll in 2000-2004 and 20% from 
2005
29. A part of the UST (maximum 14% of payroll before 2005 and 6% of pay-
roll from 2005) was paid to the federal budget, from where the money was trans-
ferred to the PFR for basic parts of labor pensions. The other portion was paid 
directly to individual accounts in the PFR for insurance and the funded portion of 
labor pensions. Pensions paid under the law of public pension provision (so called 
“public pensions”) are financed through general taxes.  
As mentioned above, labor pensions cover three groups – old age, disability, 
and survival pensions. Pensions for long service were included into old age pen-
sions. The normal pension age remains unchanged. The possibility of retiring is 
open to all individuals with a contribution period of at least five years at the age of 
55 (60). It is assumed that after the new pension system matures, pension behavior 
will be determined by incentives to work longer so as to get higher benefit, rather 
than by the legislative pension age
30. 
Old age and disability pensions consist of three parts – basic, insurance
31, and 
funded. Survival pensions include only the two first parts. A basic part of labor 
pensions is differentiated by age (below and over 80), degree of disability and the 
number of dependants. An insurance part is to be a quotient of the division of the 
total amount of contribution to the number of years, which is fixed at 19 years for 
both sexes
32. Both basic and insurance parts are to be paid monthly and for life. 
Still, there is no rule for the calculation of a funded part. It is assumed to be paid 
regularly and calculated by dividing the total amount of contributions plus invest-
ment income to the expected number of years of pension payment. But the de-
nominator remains unclear.  
                                                 
29 Since 2005 there have been three tax rates depending on the wage threshold – less than 
280,000 RUR per year, from 280,001 to 600,000 and from 600,001 and above – the higher 
the wage of the employee, the less was paid by his/her employer. These thresholds were 
not changed from 2005 to 2009. Meanwhile, if in 2005 the average annual gross wage was 
102,660 RUR per year then in 2007 it was 163,116 and in 2008 207,480 RUR per year 
[Rosstat, 2009]. Accordingly, in April 2005, 2.7% of workers in large and medium en-
terprises earned 300 to 600 thousand RUR per year and 0.6% of workers received more 
than 600 thousand RUR per year, whereas in April 2007 the shares were 7.3% and 1.8% 
[Rosstat, 2008a]. 
30 But in fact there are no incentives of later pension age because all pensioners have a 
right to work and recalculate their pension benefits. It increases the retirement age but 
keeps pension age at the lowest possible level. See more discussion of this topic [Siny-
avskaya 2002]. 
31 This part can be considered as a proxy of DC PAYG (NDC). 
32 In 2002 the denominator was equal 12 years; it is increasing gradually till 19 years by 
2013. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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Whereas in the future, it is assumed that insurance and funded parts of pensions 
will be closely tied to contributions paid, stronger indirect limitations on the dif-
ferentiation of benefits will be kept for current pensioners. All pension rights ac-
quired in the prior system were recalculated so that a person’s salary for several 
years of work was taken into account only in part, not exceeding 120% of an aver-
age national salary, from which the pension contribution was paid
33.  
A basic part of labor pension is indexed regularly by inflation or increased by 
special amendments to the law. The insurance part is also indexed by inflation but 
also by the growth rate of the contributions paid to the PFR to the insurance part 
per one pensioner. The same procedure is applied to the indexation of the notional 
“insurance capital”. This means that when the effective rate of the UST is de-
creased, than the insurance part and notional capital are indexed mainly by infla-
tion. Also, when the number of pensioners increases, the PFR incomes per pen-
sioner decrease and the insurance part and notional capital are indexed again by 
inflation only. 
Participation in the funded component of the pension system is mandatory for 
employees born in 1967 or later. Initially, the funded pillar also included ales born 
in 1953-1966 and females born in 1957-1966, who were completely excluded 
from this part of the pension system in 2005
34. For those born after 1966, employ-
ers paid 3% of their wages to the funded pillar in 2002-2003, 4% in 2004-2007 
and 6% from 2008. Respectively, contributions to the “insurance” part of the labor 
pension are 14% or less depending on the age and wage of a contributor.  
Since 2004, there are two types of insurers acting on the mandatory pension 
savings market – the state Pension Fund of Russia (PFR) and 94 nongovernmental 
(private) pension funds (NPF) are allowed to work with this type of money. Insur-
ers recruit managing companies selected to work with mandatory pension savings. 
There are also two types of these managing companies – the state managing com-
pany (Russia’s Bank of Development – VEB) and 55 private managing compa-
nies. Either an insurer or a managing company can be changed once a year only. 
By default, mandatory pension savings are kept at the PFR and managed by the 
state managing company, which had the most conservative investment portfolio 
until 2009. Control and supervision over the companies acting on the market of 
                                                 
33 Due to tax incompliance, this wage is below the average wage in the economy published 
by Rosstat. For current pensioners, the size of benefit after recalculation should not be 
lower than the benefit received before the reform, which means that pensioners previously 
employed in low-paid jobs are granted more. 
34 Therefore, the first regular payments of the funded parts of pensions will be made only 
in 2022. It is discussed now what to do with money accumulated by the cohort further 
excluded from the funded component, either to pay it as a lump-sum or to increase pay-as-
you-go insurance part to the respective amount and do not pay funded pension at all. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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mandatory pension savings is conducted by the Ministry of Finance, the Federal 
Service for Financial Markets, the Special Depositary and the Public Council for 
Investment of the Funded Part of Pensions. There is no special system of guaran-
tees of obligatory pension savings.  
An important issue of any pension reform introducing a funded component into 
a mature pension system with universal coverage is how the transition is financed. 
Contributions to funded pillars reduce the amount of money to be paid to current 
pensioners. Surprisingly, in 2002, using external sources of financing to fund the 
transition to the new pension system was not proposed
35. Rather, the reform was 
designed to keep a relatively low differentiation of pension benefits and introduce 
the funded pillar gradually over a long period of time
36.  
 
Reform implementation and adjustment 
Similar to other countries, pension reform implementation in Russia, particu-
larly related to the introduction of a funded component, was met with certain diffi-
culties. The necessary legislative documents were adopted with delays. The pri-
vate managing companies responsible for managing pension savings from 2004 
were selected by May 2003 only. People received the information about their indi-
vidual accounts from the PFR letters even later. Besides, there were no informa-
tion campaigns about the funded pension reform explaining people’s rights or why 
and how to select managing companies. As a result, no more than 2% of insured 
people of the respective ages chose private managing companies in 2003. After six 
years of the reform, more than 90% of funded pillar participants keep their savings 
under the management of VEB, which operates with 87% of total mandatory pen-
sion savings.  
The law on the mandatory occupational pension schemes aimed at the reform 
of the so called early retirement schemes has not been adopted yet. It was blocked 
primarily by the large employers with significant numbers of employees working 
in hazardous conditions or in the Far North regions, as well as by trade unions that 
did not like the design of the mandatory occupational pension plans proposed by 
the government. Thus, early retirement is still a part of the state pension system 
and thus paid by all employers.  
                                                 
35 This official position has changed in 2008, when National Wealth Fund was established 
particularly for the pension reform purposes. The Fund is based on incomes from oil and 
gas production and export. It can be used to the subsidizing of voluntary additional pension 
savings transferred on the same individual accounts as mandatory pension savings as well 
as to the balancing PFR budget. Besides, from 2006 current deficit of the PFR is already 
covered by the federal budget transfers, i.e. from general taxes. 
36 In 2005 the speed of transition was even further reduced. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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Pension legislation in Russia is constantly in the process of changing. In 2004, 
in the context of the tax reform, the UST rates and thresholds were lowered and 
therefore the effective rate of the UST decreased. It certainly reduced the tax in-
comes of the PFR. To compensate for this decline, the government decided to 
exclude middle aged people (born in 1953(57) – 1966) from the funded pillar. In 
2005, there were social protests against the reform of in kind social privileges 
(e.g., subsidized housing, free transportation, free or subsidized medicines, etc.) 
and its replacement with cash payments. The protests were spearheaded by pen-
sioners, who constituted the main group of recipients of social privileges. In re-
sponse to these protests, the government again decided to change the pension leg-
islation. It increased the universal, basic part of labor pension by 36% in March 
2005.  
As a consequence of the decisions of 2004-2005, the PFR turned out to be in a 
current account deficit
37. Until now the amount of this deficit is covered by addi-
tional transfers from the federal budget, and formally the PFR budget is balanced. 
But the share of budget financing of the pension system is increasing. The budget 
transfer to cover the deficit was 3% of all PFR incomes in 2006, and was planned 
to be 5% of the PFR incomes in 2008, 14% of incomes in 2009 and 25% in 2010.  
The unfavorable development of the funded pillar as well as the financial insus-
tainability of the pension system led to renewed discussion on the new crisis in the 
pension sphere which emerged in expert circles in 2005 [see, e.g. Maleva & Sin-
yavskaya 2005; Kolobaev & Kokorev 2006; Gurvich 2007c]. Officials and politi-
cians recognized the crisis by 2007 but preferred to focus on the issues of the low 
standards of living of pensioners and the declining replacement rate, measured as a 
ratio of the average pension to the average wage (Table 13). Taking into account 
the importance of pensioners as a prevailing part of the electorate on the eve of 
parliamentary (2007) and presidential (2008) elections, the efforts of politicians 
were concentrated on increasing benefits. As a result, basic parts of pensions were 
increased by 86.3% in 2007. The insurance parts were indexed by 9.2% in April 
2007. This policy was continued in 2008 and 2009, which indicated a shift in the 
pension reform from the original ideas of 2002. 
 
New shift in the pension reform – 2007-2010 
In the beginning of 2008, the Ministry of Health and Social Development and 
the Ministry of Finance prepared two proposals for further pension reform adjust-
                                                 
37 The reduction of payroll taxes did not produce the anticipated effect of increasing the tax 
base. The legalization of wage incomes was much less than expected, and therefore, the 
drop in PFR incomes was significant. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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ments. The main focus of the Ministry of Health and Social Development’s pro-
posal was how to increase pensions for current pensioners, while the proposal of 
the Ministry of Finance stressed the issue of financial sustainability of the pension 
system and focused on ways of decreasing the pension system’s dependence on 
the federal budget. The final version of the reform adopted by the Government in 
October 2008 was mainly inspired by the Ministry of Health and Social Develop-
ment’s proposal. It should be also stressed that most of the adopted changes to 
pension legislation were developed before the 2008 crisis, although they were later 
presented as a part of anti-crisis program. 
Almost all changes in the pension legislation implemented in 2009-2010 are 
addressed to the pensioned population and workers who will become pensioners in 
the next 5-10 years. First, in 2009, basic parts of labor pensions and social pen-
sions were substantially increased to an amount much higher than inflation. As of 
2010, regions of the Russian Federation will be obliged to pay unemployed pen-
sioners who earn benefits below the pensioners’ subsistence minimum an addi-
tional social payment up to the level of the regional subsistence minimum. The 
main idea is to eliminate the official poverty of pensioners. Second, in 2010, the 
estimated amount of pension rights acquired up to 2002 will be increased by 10%. 
In addition to this indexation, the pension rights of people who worked in Soviet 
times will be increased by 1% for each year of tenure up to 1991. This procedure 
of the indexation of pension rights formed in the old pension system, called “val-
orization”, will cost about 12% of the expenditures of the pension system on the 
current pensioners (i.e. PFR expenditures without costs of funded pillar).  
The implementation of these two steps substantially increases current and fu-
ture pension expenditures. Estimations show that in 2009, the share of pension 
expenditures in GDP increased by 2 percentage points: from 5.6% in 2008 to 7.7% 
in 2009. In 2010, it is expected to reach 9.9% of GDP.  
The idea is to shift these costs onto the federal budget and onto employers by 
increasing the effective contribution rate. The federal budget will cover increased 
pension expenditures by general taxation and the National Wealth Fund formed 
from natural resource revenues. An alternative proposal of the Ministry of Finance 
to introduce contributions paid by employees and to increase the pension age was 
not supported. In accordance with this approach, in 2010 the regressive UST rates 
were replaced by the flat contribution rate paid from wages below the ceiling of 
415,000 RUR per year
38. This contribution rate is to be raised from 20% to 26% of 
payroll as of 2011. It is going to be equalized for all groups of employers as of 
2015.  
                                                 
38 The average annual nominal wage projected by the Ministry of Economy will be 
237,384-239,700 in 2010. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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Two minor options have been proposed to young and middle age workers. First 
is the change in the investment portfolio of the managing government by default. 
As of autumn 2009, the list of instruments available for investments was expanded 
to ensure that the default company can provide a middle-risk portfolio. If someone 
prefers the most conservative portfolio in the same state managing company, s/he 
may choose that one. But given the bad situation on Russian financial markets, it 
is unclear whether the state managing company would be able to assure higher 
returns for its middle-risk portfolio. 
The second option of increasing future pensions was proposed by the RF Presi-
dent even in 2007 but can be considered part of other reform adjustments intro-
duced later. The case in point is the system of supplementary pension accumula-
tions open to new participants until the end of October 2013
39. They are available 
for any participant of any age for 10 years from the first year of contributing. The 
annual amount of monthly paid supplementary contributions of an insured person 
should be no less than 2,000 RUR, which corresponds to 8.3% of the annual 
amount of the net minimum wage in 2008 and 4.4% of the net minimum wage in 
2009
40. They are subsidized by the state at the proportion 1:1 up to 12,000 RUR 
per year
41, which is the maximum possible amount of state subsidy. State subsidies 
come from the National Wealth Fund which is made up of extra-incomes from 
production and the export of energy resources. People of pension age who post-
pone their retirement can contribute to voluntary savings accounts and get four 
times more from the state (the upper limit of the subsidy is 48,000 RUR per year). 
The subsidy is made once a year. Employers have a right to subsidize employees’ 
savings as well. In addition, an insured person can get a tax reduction for volun-
tary contributions up to 120,000 RUR per year. All the money goes to the individ-
ual’s account opened for mandatory pension savings. The administration of the 
system of supplementary accumulations is the same as that of mandatory accumu-
lations. Because accumulations in the mandatory funded pillar are financed by 
contributions paid by employers, the ownership of the pension accumulations be-
longs to the state and not to employees themselves. This is one of the most striking 
features of the Russian pension reform. 
 
                                                 
39 By September, 2009, 1643 thousands of employees have decided to participate in the 
system of additional pension accumulations. See: 
http://www.pfrf.ru/financed_public_pension/n 
40 As of January 1, 2009, the gross monthly minimum wage was raised from 2300 to 4330 
RUR per month; the income tax rate is a flat 13%. 
41 Given the projected amount of the average annual nominal wage (see footnote 38), the 
subsidy will cover nearly 5% of annual average wage. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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Assessment of future perspectives of the reform 
Despite the fact that the above-mentioned measures introduced by the govern-
ment will undoubtedly improve current pensioners’ well-being and may increase 
the incomes of future pensioners, there are facts that induce skepticism concerning 
the perspectives of the ongoing pension reform. There is evidence that the reform 
has not and will not achieve its purpose.  
The most important issue is the ability of the system to be balanced. It is not 
surprising that the PFR is in deficit now, after six years of reform. Normally, the 
introduction of a funded pillar causes a current account misbalance of the pension 
system, as it has to continue supporting the contemporary generation of pension-
ers. But this deficit in Russia is rising not only because of the funded pillar but 
mostly as a result of a decreased effective UST rate and substantially raised pen-
sion benefits [see, Soloviev et al 2006]. In other words, the Russian government is 
simultaneously trying to reduce the contribution rate and raise the replacement rate 
under the conditions of a falling system dependency ratio. Besides, the system 
could hardly be balanced in the future because when the government increases the 
basic part of labor pensions, which is universal and does not depend on contribu-
tions but is financed from payroll taxes, it goes farther from the so called defined-
contribution, or exogenous contribution rate principles. Furthermore, the insurance 
part of labor pensions has no adaptation to the changes in life expectancy as its 
denominator is fixed at 19 years for both sexes, and thus cannot be seen as a true 
NDC. Long-term forecasts, conducted even before the latest pension increases, 
showed that in order to maintain the replacement rate at the present level (25.8%) 
under the given effective UST rate, the federal budget should increase its transfers 
into the pension system up to 4-4.5% of GDP in the period of 2020-2041 [Gurvich 
2007c]. The new situation with raised pensions and pension rights acquired before 
the 2002 reform becomes even worse. 
Again, it is not surprising that the benefits of new pensioners are not closely re-
lated to their previous employment records and contributions. People who retired 
in 2003-2012 spent most of their working lives under the previous pension system. 
A significant fraction of the insurance part of their pensions will be based on re-
calculated pension rights restricted with 120% of the average wage in the econ-
omy. But recent adjustments of pension regulation relax the links between contri-
butions and benefits even more. The total amount of labor pension largely depends 
on the universal basic part. The first regular payments of the funded pensions 
shifted to 2022, and the contribution rate to this pillar is rather small. Thus, even 
according to optimistic forecasts based on a relatively high yield of pension accu-
mulations, the positive effects of the replacement rate and the links between con-
tributions and benefits will only be observed beginning in 2050 [Gurvich 2007c].  Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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However, presently the development of the funded pillar which may be a 
source of the increasing pension benefits closely related to contributions does not 
give cause for optimism. The real rates of return on mandatory pension savings 
achieved by both state and private managing companies for the whole period of 
the reform are either negative or close to zero. Together with the small contribu-
tion rate to funded individual accounts, this means that the share of the funded part 
of the pension of at least the oldest participants of this component of pension re-
form will be rather small. The design of the funded pillar, based on the employer’s 
contributions only, infrequent informing of the insured people about the state of 
their accounts  (once a year), and the right to choose nothing do not promote per-
sonal responsibility for participation in the pension system. A lack of information 
about the new pension system instruments aggravates this situation. In 2007, five 
years after the launch of the pension reform, 24% of people born in 1967 or later 
did not know anything about it; 25% said they did not participate in a funded pil-
lar; more than 50% said that they heard something about the reform and that they 
were not sure if their employers contributed something to their individual funded 
account
42. Hence, one can hardly suppose that the funded pillar will play a signifi-
cant role in influencing both the financial stability of the pension system and indi-
vidual behavior in the labor and pension spheres even in the future. 
Besides, an important feature of the Russian funded pillar design is that it does 
not lead to any sort of privatization, either formally or informally. The state keeps 
the ownership of the mandatory pension savings and most likely of the funded 
pensions (annuities) as well. Most pension savings are managed by state managing 
companies and are invested in government bonds. This situation has two conse-
quences. Firstly, it causes a negative real yield of mandatory pension savings and 
furthermore deteriorates the population’s trust in the pension system. Secondly, 
this means that in reality the pension system remains public and pay-as-you-go, as 
the contributions are used to finance state liabilities.  
The ongoing pension reform does not improve the system dependency ratio ei-
ther. The official pension age remains unchanged and the regulation itself does not 
lead to an increase in the effective pension age. Early retirement rules remain un-
changed which, according to sociological surveys, reduces the average actual pen-
sion age of men by 6 years and of women by 3 years
43. Both the fixed denominator 
                                                 
42 The data comes from two surveys conducted by the Independent Institute for Social 
Policy in 2007. The first one was done in April-June 2007 and covered 11,111 respondents 
aged 18-82. The second was conducted in July 2007 and covered 2,011 respondents aged 
16 to 90. Both surveys are representative at national level. The results have not been 
published yet. 
43 The same source of data is used. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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and the right to combine pensions with wages without any limitation on total in-
comes prevents people from postponing their applications for pension. In 2008, 
28% of pensioners were employed. High activity rates of elderly people sound 
good from the labor market perspective, but they create an additional burden on 
the pension system, producing a system dependency ratio that is much worse than 
the demographic dependency ratio, which is also deteriorating.  
The Russian pension reform did not improve the transparency of the pension 
system. The legal status of the main actors including the state PFR, the state man-
aging company, is unclear. And the share of federal budget transfers in the pension 
system is increasing. 
Finally, even the multi-pillar nature of the given pension system is in question. 
The mandatory system is mostly public and based significantly on the redistribu-
tive component of universal basic parts of pensions. The voluntary pension provi-
sion remains underdeveloped. It is increasing now mainly at the expense of the 
corporate pension programs
44 used by employers as part of their employment 
strategy. Therefore, many companies have DB pension plans; others limit pension 
portability by introducing a period of vesting from 1 to 10 years. The largest em-
ployers (Russian Energy Systems, Transneft, etc.) still pay corporate pensions 
only to those retired from the company [Russia’s Pension System… 2007]. Thus, 
although corporate pension systems increase the well-being of some groups of 
pensioners, they nevertheless limit labor mobility.  
 
Further reform options under discussion 
The latest developments in the pension system have brought the discussion 
about further possible options of the pension reform in Russia to a new turning 
point. Four questions are being debated now. The first is how to balance the PFR 
budget under the conditions of growing pension liabilities. The second is how to 
reduce the pressure of increasing mandatory pension assets on the state securities 
market, in other words, how to diversify the investment portfolio when 95% of 
pension funds are managed by the public management company. The third is how 
to assure higher returns on mandatory and voluntary pension savings. And the 
fourth is how to raise awareness and gain people’s support for the pension reform 
and its funded component. 
                                                 
44 In 2006 no more than 1.5 mln people had individual voluntary pension plans out of the 
6.4 mln pension plans opened in NPFs (The figure was cited by the head of NPF Sberbank 
Galina Morozova at the Round Table on Pension System, held on October 20, 2007 in 
Moscow). It covers only 2.2% of employed people. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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There are attempts to initiate a new wave of discussion among experts, busi-
ness circles and politicians on the possible options of future reform of the pension 
reform. Experts close to the Ministry of Finance propose to more actively seek 
external sources of pension reform financing like incomes from privatization, 
revenues from oil and gas production and export, VAT, etc. The Ministry of Fi-
nance also proposes to increase the pension age of both men and women, although 
other officials and politicians do not support this idea. Other experts suggest 
launching a reform of early retirement schemes. But the latter initiative still meets 
with opposition from employers who not interested in an increase in their payroll 
tax burden. On the whole, there are signs of attempts by employers to control the 
pension reform more actively, e.g. by offering the choice of a private pension fund 
for employees, by having more rights in designing mandatory occupational pen-
sion plans in case of early retirement reform, etc. Until now the consensus has 
only been reached on the necessity of a more active public campaign on the pen-
sion reform.  
A wide range of options rejected by officials including the following: 
1.  Increasing the normal retirement age either for both sexes or for women 
only (equalizing at the age of 60) and the introduction of mandatory con-
tributions from employee incomes - deemed unacceptable for the popula-
tion as it may cause political protests  
2.  Restricting the employment of pensioners – deemed to have potential 
negative outcomes for the labor market and poverty dynamics 
3.  Changing the property rights of mandatory pension savings (it is ex-
plained that RF should have property rights for these assets because they 
are financed through taxes) - deemed inadequate to contemporary legis-
lation (civil and tax codes) 
4.  Mandatory private pension fund with no option to make no choice - 
deemed impossible at the current level of the development of private 
pension funds and financial competence of population  
Thus, although most officials now understand the risks of sharply increased 
pension liabilities, a consensus on the possible solution to this situation has not yet 
been achieved. 
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Table 1. Pension reforms in Russia and possible effects on labor market and  
restructuring 
Options proposed / 
implemented / to be 
implemented 
Effects on labor market  Effects on restructuring 
Implemented – tax reform + 2002 pension reform 
Elimination of contribu-
tions – introduction of 
unified social tax (UST) 
paid by employers only 
Pension-related expenditures are 
perceived as taxes (incentives to 
avoid, no interest of employees) 
No 
UST regression + low-
ering the max rate (until 
2009) 
Decreases pension-related costs  
Long-run: Expected – formaliza-
tion of labor market, less ‘grey’ 
payments; actual effect is moder-
ate 
Increased labor supply of pen-
sioners because replacement rates 
decrease 
Facilitates restructuring be-
cause of lowering costs on 
business? 
Pensioners can work 
without limitations 
Short-run: Labor supply of aged 
people is increased.  
Solves problems of structural 
labor force deficit – Helps  sec-
tors not receiving enough young 
employees to survive 
Limits mobility – most pen-
sioners do not change their 
job. Effect on restructuring is 
unclear as employers can still 
fire people when they be-
come pensioners. But as 
pensioners agree to work for 
lower wages, ineffective jobs 
(firms) can be kept. 
Benefit formula change 
– no direct limits on 
benefit size, relation to 
sum of contributions 
instead of wage + sen-
iority 
LR: Expected – formalization of 
labor market, less ‘grey’ pay-
ments, more contribution compli-
ance; actual short-run effect is 
moderate 
In theory – helps to restruc-
ture as employees are not as 
interested in higher wages at 
the end of their careers as 
before 
Introduction of quasi 
NDC – no promised 
replacement rates but 
denominator not related 
to life expectancy, equal 
for men and women  
Expected by the government – 
formalization of labor market and 
less ‘grey’ payments in the short-
run and delay of retirement in the 
long-run but the effects are elimi-
nated by deviations from true 
NDC (denominator and right to 
work at pension) 
Short-run effect – no, long-
run – yes, positive 
Introduction of funded 
pillar 
Expected by the government – 
formalization of labor market and 
less ‘grey’ payments in the short-
run and delay of retirement but 
first payments from funded pillar 
will be made in 2022 only. Mod-
erate effect on formalization (in 
Portability facilitates mobil-
ity – less incentives to work 
for the same employer; the 
effect can be partially offset 
by the development of volun-
tary corporate pension plans 
with vesting organized by Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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Options proposed / 
implemented / to be 
implemented 
Effects on labor market  Effects on restructuring 






An instrument of competition for 
workers (part of social package) 
Is used by employers as a 
means of restructuring – to 
dismiss old workers by push-
ing them into occupational 
pensions 
Limits mobility (and restruc-
turing) – because of either DB 
or high minimum require-
ments for tenure to get occu-
pational pension (vesting) 
Negative - Supports the con-
centration of employment at 
large and medium enterprises 
(those who provide occupa-
tional pensions) 
Changes of pension legislation – Implemented in 2007-2010  
Introduction of volun-
tary pension saving 
scheme subsidized by 
the state (1,000 rubles 
from state (up to 
12,000) per 1,000 rubles 
of contributions during 
5 years) 
No effect  Positive effect as there is no 
vesting 
Motivation of voluntary 
later retirement: 4,000 
rubles from the state (up 
to 48,000) per 1,000 
rubles of contributions 
of people of pension age 
delayed receiving pen-
sion 
No effect because increment in 
pension is too small compared to 
the incomes forgone (pensions 
that could have been received in 
addition to wage) 
No effect? 
Introduction of addi-
tional payment to the 
pension up to the level 
of pensioners’ regional 
subsistence minimum 
paid to non-working 
pensioners 
Negative effect of formal em-
ployment of pensioners 
No effect? 
Replacement of unified 
social tax (UST) with 
pension contributions 
paid by employers 
No effect when the rate is not 
changed and employees’ contri-
butions are not introduced 
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Options proposed / 
implemented / to be 
implemented 
Effects on labor market  Effects on restructuring 
Introduction of the flat 
rate of pension contribu-
tion 
(as of 2010) and further 
increase of the rate (as 
of 2011) 
Pension-related labor costs will 
increase – negative effect on 
labor demand, possible negative 
effect on wage growth. In the 
case of the substantial growth of 
contribution rates – possible 
increase of shadow sector of 
labor market, particularly at small 
firms 
Very moderate negative 
effect of replacing regressive 
scale by flat rate of contribu-
tions. Stronger negative 
effect if contribution rates 
will be increased at a level 
higher than wage growth 
More revenues to the 
pension system – by 
attracting extra incomes 
from energy resources 
(from 2010) or pro-
ceeds from privatiza-
tion (under discussion) 
Allows keeping labor costs at low 
level 
Facilitates restructuring be-
cause of keeping low costs 
on business? 
Currently proposed by the government 
Equalize pension con-
tribution rates for dif-
ferent groups of em-
ployers 
Increase labor costs for certain 
groups of employers (mainly 
inefficient – e.g. agriculture) – 
equal rules for different employ-
ers 
Long-run: Facilitates restruc-
turing? No more special 
preferences for ineffective 
agricultural sector 
Early retirement scheme 
reform by means of 
implementation of man-
datory funded occupa-
tional pension plans 
Increase in pension-related costs 
on employers with jobs in haz-
ardous conditions will negatively 
affect wage level of workers 
employed in hazardous condi-
tions.  
Facilitates restructuring by 
decreasing the number of 
jobs with hazardous condi-
tions. Depending on the 
design of the reform, it can 
either increase portability of 
occupational pensions or 
decrease it if employers get 
more rights in choosing the 
NPF and deciding on vest-
ing. 
Discussed by the government 
Basic part of labor pen-
sions (and perhaps so-
cial pensions) – to be 
financed through gen-
eral taxes 
Total tax burden on business 
would probably increase but 
payroll taxes remain low – no 
negative effect on labor demand? 
No effect? 
Increase in retirement 
age (equalize normal 
pension age of men and 
women or increase it for 
both sexes) 
Longer participation on labor 
market, less pressure on increase 
of taxes  
No effect? Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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Options proposed / 
implemented / to be 
implemented 
Effects on labor market  Effects on restructuring 
Not discussed now 
Increase of contribu-
tions to funded pillar  
Depends on the scheme – at the 
expense of 
a)  current taxes in favor of 
basic part – pension-
related costs on employ-
ers (and employees) will 
not change – no effect, 
b)  individual contributions 
of employees – pressure 
on further legalization of 
wages 
c)  increase of contribution 
rates – negative effect 
If funds will be delivered to 
national investment projects 
(not state securities!) – posi-
tive  
Introduction of individ-
ual contributions (by 
employees)  
More individual responsibility + 
interest to pension reform – 
stronger pressure on employer 
(but the result depends on the 
bargaining abilities of workers 
and the situation on the labor 
market) 
Long-run: positive  
Benefit formula change 
– return to NDC – es-
tablish links with life 
expectancy 
More transparency in accumulat-




ment of pensioners 
Short-term effect: Outflow of 
elderly workers from labor mar-
ket – negative effect 
Long-term effect on labor supply 
– could be positive if people 
would delay retirement 
Could be positive & strong 
Changes in ownership 
rights on mandatory 
pension savings – from 
the state to the people 
More individual responsibility + 
interest in pension reform – 
stronger pressure on employer 
(but the result depends on the 
bargaining abilities of workers 
and the situation on the labor 
market) 
? if people move to private 
funds and investments in 
private securities would 
increase – could be positive 
(through more money in 
national investment projects) 
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3.4.2.  Ukraine 
 
As mentioned earlier, the pension system in Ukraine has played an important 
role in keeping the elderly population out of poverty. The system provides sizable 
benefits to over 30% of Ukrainian voters. Therefore the government took the ad-
vice of the international community and together with the PADCO/USAID advi-
sory project developed a new multi-tier pension system. The system was intro-
duced by law in 2003, and started operating in January 2004.  
Following the example of other CEE countries, Ukraine started its pension re-
form and introduced a multi-tier (mandatory and voluntary funds) pension system. 
The reform was carried out at the beginning of this century, and the new pension 
system was introduced in 2003. However, the country is still in the early stages of 
the process and the new systems are expected to have an impact in 15-20 years. 
The new system introduced three tiers. The first tier is a PAYG system with 
benefits based on the careful accounting of personal contributions to the system 
instead of average wage and years worked. The pensions of the beneficiaries of the 
previous pension system were recalculated to the new system, and most benefits 
were slightly increased. The second tier is a fully-funded pension investment fund 
run by the government. The third tier is a system of licensed private pension funds.  
 
The pension system in Ukraine introduced in 2004 
The new law “On Mandatory State Pension Insurance” enacted in 2004 intro-
duced a pension system that is significantly different from the Soviet-type pension 
system that existed in Ukraine prior to the introduction of this law. The new sys-
tem is based on the three pillars. 
 
First pillar - traditional tax based (PAYG) system  
This system is funded by payroll taxes on the employer and taxes on the em-
ployee. The system provides old-age pensions, disability pensions, and survival 
pensions. The law also states that there may be special categories of pensioners 
who receive pensions from the solidarity fund according to rules different from the 
general rules outlined in the law. We interpret this as the possibility to receive 
special service pensions.  
Old-age pension is guaranteed to every male over 60 and every female over 55 
if they have worked for at least five years. The minimal pension is guaranteed to 
males that worked at least 25 years, and females that worked at least 20 years. The Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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minimal pension is required to be higher than the minimal subsistence level in the 
country determined by the budget law.  
The amount of the pension payment from the solidarity system is determined by 
(1) total duration of employment, (2) amount of payments to the pension fund, (3) 
individual income coefficient, and (4) average salary in the country in the year prior 
to the year in which the pension is paid. The amount of old-age pension is increased 
for every year of delayed pension (not applying for pension after reaching pension 
age). The maximum increase is over 85% for delaying pension for 10 years.  
The pension fund introduced personalised accounting of pension payments for 
every individual that uses it at the first and second pillars of the pension system. 
Pensions provided to the persons of pension age before the introduction of this law 
were re-calculated according to the new system and are provided from the solidar-
ity pillar.  
The solidarity system is managed by the Pension Fund of Ukraine. The Pension 
Fund is a non-profit organization in Ukraine. For the first five years after the in-
troduction of the law, the Pension Fund will have a status similar to the status of a 
ministry in Ukraine.  
 
Second pillar - State Pension Investment Fund 
This system is based on individual accounts for each person participating in the 
mandatory state pension insurance. The system is funded by a portion of the pay-
roll taxes paid to the Pension Fund. The State Pension Investment Fund invests 
funds into enterprises in order to generate additional income. The State Investment 
Fund provides individuals with one of the following types of pensions: fixed-term 
annuity, life-long annuity, annuity for spouse, and single payment pension.  
Payments of the pensions (except the single-payment pension) are administered 
by insurance companies which are contracted either by individuals or the pension 
fund. When an individual becomes a pensioner, the State Pension Investment Fund 
transfers the amount accumulated by the individual at the personal account to the 
managing insurance company which provides payments to the individual accord-
ing to the contract between the individual and the insurance company. The over-
sight of insurance companies is conducted by the State Commission on the Regu-
lation of Financial Service Markets.  
A single-payment pension is paid to individuals in some special cases such as 
change of country of residence or the accumulation of an amount of money which 
is less than the minimum required for an annuity. In the case of the death of a per-
son prior to becoming a pensioner, the State Pension Investment Fund pays the 
accumulated balance as inheritance to the beneficiaries of this person.  PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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The State Pension Investment Fund was created by the State Pension Fund as 
an extra-budgetary fund. It is managed by the Supervisory Board of the State Pen-
sion Investment Fund and uses the management infrastructure of the State Pension 
Fund. The Supervisory Board of the State Pension Investment Fund consists of 14 
individuals, half of which are designated by President, and half by the Verkhovna 
Rada of Ukraine.  
The assets of the State Pension Investment Fund are the property of the insured 
persons; each person has property rights for an amount accumulated on his/her 
personal account. The assets of the State Pension Investment Fund are managed by 
designated asset management companies. Designated asset management compa-
nies are determined though tender procedure, and are contracted for a term of five 
years.  
The assets of the State Pension Investment Fund can be invested in papers is-
sued or guaranteed by the government of Ukraine, a foreign government, and in 
papers traded on certain international stock exchanges. By law, the amount in-
vested in papers guaranteed by all levels of the government of Ukraine should not 
exceed 50% of the total assets of the fund.  
The State Pension Investment Fund started functioning with the adoption of the 
Law on the Transfer of Part of the Revenues of the State Pension Fund to the State 
Pension Investment Fund. According to the current law, this special law can be 
adopted only if the economy of the country grows at least 2% a year in real terms 
for at least two years in a row.  
 
Third pillar - Private Pension System 
This system can be implemented through private pension funds, banks provid-
ing pension deposit accounts, and insurance companies. The system can provide 
fixed-term annuities, annuities (pensions), single pension payments, and annuities 
(pensions) for a spouse. The system is funded on a non-mandatory bases though 
individual payments. The third pillar of the Pension System can be introduced 
only eleven years after the introduction of the second pillar.  
 
Funding the system 
The current rates of payroll taxes paid by enterprises and individuals to the 
Pension Fund are determined by the Budget Law. The law also determines the 
fraction of payments that is directed to the second pillar of the system after the 
Law on the Transfer of Part of the Revenues of the State Pension Fund is adopted. 
The law on Mandatory State Pension Insurance also introduces sealing for the 
mandatory monthly payments to the pension fund at the amount of seven average Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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salaries in the previous year. However, this part of the law was suspended by 
budget laws in 2006 and 2007.  
Special pensions for people who had rights for increased pensions under the 
previous law, such as pensions for military personnel and for people working in 
hazardous conditions, should be paid from special sectoral supplementary pension 
funds. However, until such funds are created, these increased pensions are being 
provided by the State Pension Fund. The increased expenditures should be fully 
covered by additional transfers from the sectors of economy whose employees are 
eligible for the increased pensions.   
The 2004 – 2005 period was a politically charged election period that had a 
tremendous effect on the development of the Ukrainian social safety net. Ukraine 
had a presidential election in November 2004, which resulted in the so-called “Or-
ange Revolution” and ended in January 2005. As a result of the revolution, the 
power to form the government was shifted from the president to parliament. A 
year after the first post-revolution government was formed, Ukraine had parlia-
mentary elections (March 2006). Both elections were dominated by two political 
forces that had almost identical numbers of supporters. In order to win extra votes, 
both political forces began promising increases in social benefits to pensioners and 
the poor.  
Increases in social benefits were implemented de facto in the second half of 
2004, and then adopted de jure in 2005. Minimum benefits of most welfare pro-
grams increased 3 to 12 times, and average benefits increased 25-70%. Further 
increases were planned for 2006 [MLSP PFU 2005]. As the result, social welfare 
expenditures (including pensions) increased from 11.9% of GDP in 2003 to 17.4% 
in 2005. The government also increased the minimum wage 40% (an increase of 
approximately 30% increase in real terms) in 2005, which resulted in an increase 
in wages paid to employees in the public sector and increased budget expenditures 
on healthcare, education, and government employees.  
The political situation also did not allow the government to increase tax rates 
and even demanded a decrease in some taxes. For example, the personal income 
tax law provided for a 13% flat tax rate for a period of two years that was to have 
been replaced by a permanent 15% flat tax rate in 2006. However, due to political 
pressures the increase was postponed. Another example is the simplified taxation 
of small businesses. The previous president issued a decree in 2001 establishing 
“simplified taxation for small businesses”. Businesses with a turnover of less than 
$100,000 a year and up to 10 employees could pay a flat tax (only 200 UAH, or 
$40 a month in 2004-2005) instead of all taxes on their businesses, including pay-
roll taxes. The decree should have lost effect when the new president was elected 
in 2004. However, the decree was extended because of the adverse reaction of PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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small business owners. As a result, most employees of small businesses still do not 
make sizable contributions to the pension system or other social insurance funds. 
They are protected by some social insurances, but their contributions to the pen-
sion fund will not allow for providing them with anything but minimal pension 
rates when they retire.  
There is no final report yet, but the deficit in the pension fund was about 5-6% 
of the GDP in 2005, and was financed from the state budget. However, the overall 
performance of the state budget was not a disaster in 2005. The government man-
aged to attract about $2 billion from the privatization of Krivorizhstal, the largest 
steel-producing plant in Ukraine. It also managed to increase the revenues from 
VAT and the enterprise profit tax by eliminating tax exemptions, such as free eco-
nomic zones, and prosecuting businesses that avoid paying taxes. As a result, be-
cause the government viewed privatization as part of budget revenues, the budget 
deficit in 2005 was kept under 2% of GDP, and the state debt was decreased.   
The good performance of the 2005 budget led policymakers to believe that in-
creasing social welfare benefits might be sustained. Extending the offers to the 
voters, politicians in the parliamentary election campaign not only promised in-
creases in social benefits, but also promised to decrease payroll taxes from 39% to 
25%. They expressed the belief that in the short-run the increased social welfare 
benefits could be financed from other revenues of the state budget, while at the 
same time reduced payroll taxes would stimulate the expansion of the tax base for 
the social insurance funds in the long-run.  
However, international experts do not share the opinion of Ukrainian politi-
cians that the increased expenditures can be sustained. A recent issue of the Eco-
nomic Survey of Europe [UNECE 2005] noted, “The political cycle in Ukraine led 
to a significant relaxation of fiscal policy as the presidential elections drew closer. 
Although this is a widespread phenomenon, some of the populist pre-election 
moves (such as the large increases in pensions in September and the planned rise 
in public sector wages) will have lasting negative fiscal implications as they are 
equivalent to a general increase in government spending. As a result, the underly-
ing structural fiscal balance is likely to have deteriorated significantly in 2004. As 
shown by the experience of some east European countries (for example, Hungary) 
this type of fiscal loosening (involving notable wage increases) can have a lasting 
and damaging effect on macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, the negative fiscal 
implications of such moves are very difficult to reverse or offset, especially during 
a downturn in the growth cycle.” 
The sustainability of the new pension system was based on the following as-
sumptions: that the relatively low replacement ratio of the PAYG system would be 
maintained; that the tax base would expand due to decreasing payroll tax rates; Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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that the second tier would enter into effect as soon as the capital markets legisla-
tion allows for the creation of the state investment fund, and that the third tier 
would be introduced by 2010.  
Together with the introduction of the new pension system, the Ukrainian gov-
ernment took steps to ensure the expansion of the tax base. In 2003, it cut the per-
sonal income tax to the 13% flat rate (which was supposed to be replaced by a 
15% flat rate in 2006); it decreased the payroll taxes from 52 to 37% (paid by em-
ployers) plus 2 % paid by employees; and it introduced a cap on the monthly pay-
roll tax for a single employee. These steps were expected to reduce the economic 
stimulus to hide wage income and increase the tax base for payroll and income 
taxes.  
The results of the pension reform have been moderately positive. The progress of 
the reform was delayed by factors that were not directly related to the reform. First, 
a feature of the pension reform in Ukraine was that it implemented new individual 
accounting for personal contributions, and pensions of current pensioners were re-
calculated in the new system. The result of the transition, as expected, was a slight 
increase in the average pension. At the same time, minimum pensions increased 
almost two-fold, from 47 UAH in 2003 to 92 UAH in 2004. However, the political 
processes at the end of 2004/beginning of 2005 introduced changes to the pension 
system and required setting minimum pensions at the level of minimum subsistence. 
As a result, at the beginning of 2005, the minimum pension was set at 332 UAH, 
which is 3.6 times higher
45. The average old-age pension increased 1.74 times dur-
ing the same period [MPSF PFU 2005]. This resulted in a significant increase in 
expenditures of the first (solidarity) tier of the pension system.  
Second, a significant number of workers are not contributing to the pension 
system. As mentioned earlier, in order to reduce distortions caused by high taxes, 
the Ukrainian government reduced the personal income tax rate to a 13% flat rate 
and payroll taxes to 39% in 2004. The reduced and simplified personal income tax 
almost eliminated incentives for workers to stay in the shadow economy, which 
was expected to increase the payroll tax base.  
At the same time, in order to reduce the cost of compliance, the government in-
troduced simplified taxation for small enterprises and private entrepreneurs, which 
allowed for the substitution of different taxes (including payroll taxes) with a low 
lump-sum tax or a single flat-rate tax [see Alm, Saavedra 2006 for details]. The 
President’s decree in 2001 established that businesses with a turnover of less than 
$100,000 a year and up to 10 employees may pay a flat tax (only 200 UAH, or $40 
                                                 
45 However comparing nominal changes in countries with high inflation, like Ukraine, is 
not correct. In real terms the increase in minimal pension was also over 300% (3 times). PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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a month in 2004-2005) instead of all taxes on their businesses, including payroll 
taxes. There are about 1.5 million private and legal entities using simplified taxa-
tion in Ukraine today [Alm, Saavedra 2006], and their employees pay very small 
contributions to the pension fund
46. 
The decree would have lost effect when the new president was elected in 2004. 
However, the life of this decree was extended because of the adverse reaction of 
small business owners. The Ukrainian government tried to collect payroll taxes 
from private individuals and enterprises subject to simplified taxation in 2005 in 
order to provide unemployment and pension insurance for their employees. The 
Parliament did not support the government’s attempt to collect payroll taxes from 
these entrepreneurs since they represent a large portion of voters and have a strong 
lobby against such changes. As a result, most employees working in small busi-
nesses still do not make sizable contributions to the pension or other social insur-
ance funds. They are protected by some social insurances, but their contributions 
to the pension fund will not provide them with anything but minimal pensions 
when they retire. If the government succeeds in changing the simplified tax legis-
lation to collect payroll taxes from these enterprises, the result might be that these 
enterprises are forced into the shadow economy. 
Third, the introduction of the second and the third tier of the pension system 
are stalled by the insufficient development of the financial markets in Ukraine.  
Because of frustration with the delayed introduction of the next stages of pen-
sion reform and social pressure to increase the pension amount, the Parliament of 
Ukraine continues to make changes within the current pension system. Recent 
changes were directed towards an increase in pension benefits, the guarantee of 
higher minimum benefits, and the reduction of disproportional large special pen-
sions. Further increases in pensions and some co-payments to pensions have been 
promised by politicians during recent election campaign. However, these changes 
do not intend to change the fundamentals of the pension system.  
The fundamental reform is considered for the whole social security system, 
and, therefore, also relates to pensions. Following the recent experience of Russia, 
the Ukrainian government is discussing the introduction of a single social security 
tax that will allow people to pay contributions to all social funds in a single pay-
ment which is further distributed among social funds. The introduction of the sin-
gle social security tax is expected to simplify the collection of SSN contributions, 
especially for tax agents. Because of this simplification, it is expected that simpli-
fied tax laws would be changed to exclude social contributions, and social security 
                                                 
46 Part of the lump-sum tax is directed to the pension fund. However, this amount was only 
about 2-10 UAH a month in 2006, when under the general system a person with minimum 
wage would contribute about 61 UAH a month [Libanova 2006]. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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tax would be paid for every employee independent of the size or type of business. 
This change is expected to increase the amount of collected social contributions. 
Various pension reform options are being discussed in Ukraine now. However 
the current economic situation together with the pre-presidential election uncer-
tainty do not contribute to making decisions on such a socially and politically sen-
sitive issue as radical pension reform. 
Thus, it seems that at least until the crisis Russia was more advanced in the 
course of pension reform than Ukraine.  
 PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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Concluding Remarks and  
Recommendations 
Industrial restructuring can be affected by social security schemes and their re-
forms, especially because pension systems typically form a major part of these 
schemes. Many reforms throughout Europe have been triggered by demographic 
changes. In transition countries, the demographic changes are complicated by spe-
cific transition phenomena that make the reforms more difficult on the one hand, 
but also more necessary on the other. New EU member states have already com-
pleted the difficult process of transition and many of them have also introduced 
pension reforms that should help not only their public finances but also the situa-
tion of their labour markets. In this paper we analysed the situations in Russia and 
Ukraine, which are different from the situations in EU countries. We have focused 
on select economic and social elements in the complex net of relationships related 
to pension reform.  
In this paper, we have addressed issues related to demographic developments. 
They matter the most – even if economists do not think so. Demography rules in 
economics. We also presented the situation from the viewpoint of economic de-
velopments, in particular financial markets. However, financial markets operate in 
the short-run and belong to the micro “world”, while public pension systems are 
macro by definition and they operate in the long run (over several decades). Both 
countries analysed in the paper, namely Russia and Ukraine, have many similari-
ties, in particular their common past, but they also differ in significant ways. This 
paper focused on both similarities and differences in an attempt to provide the 
reader with a comprehensive understanding of the current situation and prospects 
for the future for both countries. 
Successful industrial restructuring requires not only flexible labour markets but 
also a well-designed and well-functioning social security infrastructure. If it does 
not correspond to the challenges faced by societies then it slows down rather than 
speeds up industrial restructuring. This means social security reforms are not just 
on the margin of the policy agenda. They are at the centre of it. 
The key finding of this paper is that the combination of delayed economic tran-
sition and population ageing is very risky, and can make a country highly vulner-
able to adverse economic or social shocks such as the current economic crisis. Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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When we started working on the project 2-3 years ago, we identified this as a ma-
jor risk, i.e. a good economic situation (high prices for Russian and Ukrainian 
products and generally strong growth) turning into a bad one. The good situation 
has been at least partially salvaged by shifting the social security framework from 
one that was hampering economic and social development to one that is contribut-
ing to stronger development. 
Are the governments of Russia and Ukraine pursuing the best possible paths for 
developing their social security frameworks for industrial restructuring? This is 
not a question we can answer, however we can say that many challenges still lie 
ahead. PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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Table 1. Economic Indicators in Russia 
Consolidated budget as % of 








Dec.  Revenues Expenditures Deficit
Pension fund 
expenditures, 
% of GDP 
1990 100.0  -3.0 n.d.  24.8  23.4  1.3  n.d. 
1991 95.0  -5.0  260.4 22.2  24.9  -2.7  n.d. 
1992 81.2  -14.5  2608.8 27.9  31.6  -3.7  4.7 
1993 74.2  -8.7  939.9 29.0  33.6  -4.7  6.0 
1994 64.7  -12.7  315.1 28.2  37.7  -9.5  6.0 
1995 62.1  -4.1  231.3 30.6  34.0  -3.4  6.0 
1996 59.9  -3.6  121.8 27.8  32.5  -4.7  6.2 
1997 60.7  1.4  111.0 30.4  35.8  -5.5  7.4 
1998 57.5  -5.3  184.4 26.1  32.0  -5.9  6.4 
1999 61.2  6.4  136.5 25.2  26.1  -0.9  5.6 
2000 67.3  10.0  120.2 28.7  26.8  1.9  4.7 
2001 70.7  5.1  118.6 30.0  27.1  3.0  5.8 
2002 74.0  4.7  115.1 32.5  31.6  0.9  7.3 
2003 79.4  7.3  112.0 31.3  29.9  1.3  6.1 
2004 85.1  7.2  111.7 32.0  27.5  4.5  5.8 
2005 90.6  6.4  110.9 39.7  31.6  8.1  6.0 
Sources: Rosstat (2006) Social Situation and Living Standards of Russian Population, 
2006. M., P. 28, 190; Rosstat (2003) Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2003. M., Pp. 30-31, 
547-548, 553, 614. 
Table 2. Indicators of inequality in Russia 
Incomes Wages 










1991 4.5  n.d.  0.260  n.d.  n.d. 
1992 8.0  n.d.  0.290  n.d.  n.d. 
1993 11.2  n.d.  0.398  n.d.  n.d. 
1994 15.1  n.d.  0.409  23.4  0.439 
1995 13.5  n.d.  0.381  26.4  0.454 
1996 13.0  n.d.  0.375  24.0  0.445 
1997 13.2  n.d.  0.381  25.0  0.447 
1998 13.8  n.d.  0.398  n.d.  n.d. 
1999 14.0  n.d.  0.399  32.1  0.482 
2000 13.9  n.d.  0.395  34.0  0.483 PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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Incomes Wages 










2001 13.9  6.5  0.397  39.6  0.508 
2002 14.0  6.6  0.397  30.5  0.477 
2003 14.5  6.7  0.403  30.0  0.481 
2004 15.2  7.0  0.409  26.4  0.467 
2005 14.8  6.8  0.405  24.9  0.456 
Note: * Fund coefficient = average income per capita of top 10% to the bottom 10%. 
Sources: Annual Review of Economic Policy in Russia in 2001; Russian Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (2002, p. 349). Labor and Employment in 1999; Goskomstat (1999, p. 
323). Labor and Employment in 2005; Rosstat (2005, p. 475). Social situation and living 
standard of Russian population in 2006; Rosstat (2006. p.138). 
 
Table 3. Gender dimension of Russian labor market 
Employment rate,  
15-72 
Employment rate,  
16-54/59    
males females males females 
Males monthly wage /  
females monthly wage 
1992  73.6 60.4 82.2 77.5  n.d. 
1993  71.1 57.8 79.6 74.7  n.d. 
1994  66.8 54.0 76.6 72.0  n.d. 
1995  65.2 52.9 74.6 70.2  n.d. 
1996  63.9 51.9 73.3 69.0  n.d. 
1997  60.9 49.5 70.0 65.7  n.d. 
1998  58.5 48.1 68.2 63.5  1.42 
1999  62.8 52.2 71.1 66.3  1.54 
2000  64.1 53.8 72.7 68.1  1.58 
2001  63.6 53.8 72.5 67.6  1.58 
2002  63.9 55.4 72.4 68.6  1.50 
2003  64.8 55.9 73.1 68.5  1.55 
2004  64.9 55.9 72.6 68.1  1.57 
2005  66.1 57.5 73.3 69.3  n.d. 
Source: Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1999. M., 1999, P. 107. Russian Statistican Year-
book, 2005; M., 2005; p. 139-140. Labor & Employment, 2005. p. 446-447. 
 
Table 4. Economic indicators for Ukraine 
Consolidated budget as % of GDP* 
Year  Real GDP 
(1990=100)
Real GDP 
growth  Revenues  Expendi-




1991  91.3  -8.7%          9.5% 
1992 82.3  -9.9%  24.4%  38.1%  -13.7%  7.9% 
1993 70.6  -14.2%  33.5%  38.6%  -5.1%  8.3% 
1994 54.4  -22.9%  43.5%  52.4%  -8.9%  7.4% 
1995 47.8  -12.2%  38.0%  44.6%  -6.6%  7.9% 
1996 43.0  -10.0%  37.0%  41.9%  -4.9%  9.3% 
1997 41.7  -3.0%  30.1% 36.7%  -6.6%  10.2% Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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Consolidated budget as % of GDP* 
Year  Real GDP 
(1990=100) 
Real GDP 
growth  Revenues  Expendi-




1998 40.9  -1.9%  28.2%  30.4%  -2.2%  9.3% 
1999 40.8  -0.2%  25.2%  26.7%  -1.5%  9.5% 
2000 43.2  5.9%  28.9%  28.3%  0.6%  8.4% 
2001 47.2  9.2%  26.9%  27.2%  -0.3%  8.8% 
2002 49.7  5.2%  27.4%  26.7%  0.7%  10.1% 
2003 54.4  9.6%  28.2%  28.4%  -0.2%  9.1% 
2004 61.0  12.1%  26.5% 29.7%  -3.2%  11.4% 
2005 62.6  2.6%  31.6%  33.4%  -1.8%  14.6% 
* Note that the Ukrainian official figures are different from those reported in World Bank 
databases due to the difference in methodologies. 
Source: Committee for Statistics of Ukraine, www.ukrstat.gov.ua, Bulletins of the Pension 
Fund, www.pension.kiev.ua. 
 























































1991 52,056.6  -  -  48.0% -  0.0%  25.2% 1.91   
1992 52,244.1  -  -  45.9% -  0.3%  26.0% 1.76   
1993 52,114.4  -  -  45.9% -  0.4%  27.2% 1.69   
1994 51,728.4  -  -  44.5% -  0.4%  28.0% 1.59   
1995 51,297.1  73.4%  49.8%  47.0% 5.6%  0.5%  28.3% 1.66   
1996 50,818.4  74.1%  51.4%  47.5% 7.6%  1.3%  28.5% 1.66   
1997 50,370.8  73.1%  51.8%  47.2% 8.9%  2.4%  28.8% 1.64   
1998 49,918.1  73.4%  52.0%  46.1% 11.3%  3.9%  29.0% 1.59   
1999 49,429.8  73.4%  45.6%  40.4% 11.6%  5.2%  29.3% 1.38   
2000 48,923.2  73.9%  46.7%  41.2% 11.6%  5.1%  29.6% 1.39   
2001 48,457.1  74.3%  46.3%  41.2% 10.9%  4.5%  29.7% 1.39   
2002 48,003.5  74.8%  46.3%  41.9% 9.6%  4.7%  30.0% 1.40   
2003 47,622.5  75.3%  46.6%  42.3% 9.1%  4.5%  30.2% 1.40   
2004 47,280.8  75.8%  47.0%  42.9% 8.6%  4.4%  30.2% 1.42   
2005 46,929.5  76.4%  47.5%  44.1% 7.2%  4.0%  30.0% 1.47   
Source: Committee for Statistics of Ukraine, www.ukrstat.gov.ua, International Labour 
Organization www.ilo.org. 
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Table 6. Main statistics of private pension funds in Russia 





254 279 270 270 262 251 287 283 296 290 289 
Incl. 




n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 15.6  33.6  51.4  89.6  169.8 277.4  405.2 
as % to 












155.9 187.4 174.1 258.5 281.9 330.5 351.8 428.0 500.6 705.7 865.5 
as a % to 
the num-









n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 0.6  1.0  2.0  3.3  5.0  7.6 12.4 






n.d.  n.d.  n.d.  n.d. 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.9 
Sources: Social Situation and Living Standards of Russia’s Population in 2001: stat.coll. / 
Goskomstat of Russia. M., 2001. P. 175. Social Situation and Living Standards of Russia’s 
Population in 2004: stat.coll. / Rosstat. M., 2004. P. 236. Social Situation and Living Stan-
dards of Russia’s Population in 2004: stat.coll. / Rosstat. M., 2004. P. 193. Web-site of the 
Federal Financial Markets Service http://www.fcsm.ru/catalog.asp?ob_no=3614 Web-site 
“Laboratory of Pension Reform” http://www.pensionreform.ru/pension/lpr_openinfo. 
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Table 7. Main statistics of private pension funds in Ukraine 
   2005  2006  9 mon. 2007 
Number of Non-state pension funds (NSPFs)  54  79  95 
Number of pension fund administrators  37  41  47 
NSPFs created earlier, currently under restruc-
turing  2 2  1 
Increase in number of  NSPFs from previous 
year  61% 32%  17% 
Total value of assets of NSPFs (thousands 
UAH)  46,154.3 137,369.1  226,493.3 
Number of persons covered under contracts 
with NSPFs (thousands)  88.4 193.3  260.3 
Number of contracts (thousands), including:  30.6  41.5  49.5 
contract with private persons  21.3  28.5  35.2 
contracts with private entrepreneurs  0.0  0.0  0.0 
contracts with companies  9.3  13.0  14.5 
Total amount of contributions to the NSPFs 
(cumulative, thousands UAH), including  36,351.5 114,397.3  195,532.1 
from private individuals  2,188.1  5,262.7  10,604.3 
from private entrepreneurs  8.3  19.8  35.5 
from companies  34,155.1  109,114.7  184,892.2 
Investment income of the NSPFs (cumulative, 
thousands UAH)  9,709.4 45,291.8  47,750.1 
Administrative and other expenditures (cumu-
lative, thousands UAH)  1,268.4 6,084.2  14,201.1 
Profitability of NSPF investments   98% 35% 
Source: State Commission on Securities and Stock Market. 
 
Table 8. State debt in Ukraine 
State debt of 
Ukraine (thou-
sand USD)  
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total state and 
state guaranteed 
debt 
14,548,152.8 16,097,021.2 15,474,567.9 15,950,201.5 17,573,216.2 
Total State Debt  12,409,888.5 12,757,252.0 12,504,044.5 13,091,838.9 14,117,678.9 
internal debt  3,855,159.4 3,949,430.2 3,799,661.6 3,288,655.9 3,526,017.1 
external debt  8,554,729.1 8,807,821.8 8,704,382.9 9,803,183. 0 10,591,661.8 
Total State Guar-
anteed Debt  2,138,264.3 3,339,769.2 2,970,523.4 2,858,362.6 3,455,537.3 
Internal  debt  181.2 182.1 191.3 191.3  198,211.1 
external debt  2,138,083.1 3,339,587.0 2,970,332.1 2,858,171.3 3,257,326.2 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Ukraine 
(http://www.minfin.gov.ua/file/link/160467/file/Stat_borg.pdf). PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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Table 9. Life expectancy dynamics in Russia, Ukraine and France 
   1960 1965 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Life expectancy at birth 
Males  63.7 64.4 63.1 61.4 63.8 58.1 59.0 58.9  Russia 
Females 72.3 73.3 73.4 73.0 74.3 71.6 72.2 72.4 
Males  67.4 67.8 66.5 64.6 65.6 61.2 62.1 61.5  Ukraine 
Females 73.8 74.6 74.4 74.1 74.9 72.5 73.5 73.4 
Males  67.0 67.5 68.4 70.2 72.7 73.9 75.3 76.8  France 
Females 73.6 74.7 75.8 78.4 81.0 81.9 82.8 83.8 
Life expectancy at age of 60 
Males  16.0 15.4 14.8 14.3 14.7 13.1 13.2 13.2  Russia 
Females 20.2 19.7 19.5 19.3 19.5 18.5 18.7 19.0 
Males  17.5 16.7 16.0 15.2 15.3 13.8 14.0 13.8  Ukraine 
Females 20.7 20.1 19.8 19.4 19.6 18.5 18.9 19.1 
Males  15.7 15.7 16.2 17.3 19.0 19.7 20.4 21.5  France 
Females 19.5 20.1 20.8 22.4 24.2 25.0 25.6 26.4 
Source: Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max 
Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Life tables by year of death (pe-
riod), 1x1, female, male. Available at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de (data 
downloaded on September 26, 2007). 
 
Table 10. Indicators of Russian population structure (by the date of census; by Janu-
ary 1; per 1000 people) 
   1959 1979 1989 2002 2004 2005 2006 
Share in total population of certain sex: 
men  60+,  women  55+  118 163 185 205 203 203 204 
men  60+  62  85  101 137 131 127 124 
women  55+  163 230 259 264 266 270 273 
OADR  for  both  sexes  202 270 325 335 325 323 322 
men and women aged 60+ /  
men and women aged 20-59  166 245 280 328 308 294 284 
Notes: OADR – old-age dependency ratio (men of 60 and over and women of 55 and over 
per 1000 men aged 16-59 and women aged 16-54) 
Sources: Author’s calculation based on the Demographic Yearbook of Russia. 2005., M.: 
Rosstat, 2006. P. 30-31; Sotsialnoe polozhenie i uroven’ zhisni naselenia Rossii. 2004. M.: 
Rosstat, 2004. P. 49; Sotsialnoe polozhenie i uroven’ zhisni naselenia Rossii. 2005. M.: 
Rosstat, 2005. P. 50; Sotsialnoe polozhenie i uroven’ zhisni naselenia Rossii. 2006. M.: 
Rosstat, 2006. P. 51. 
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TFR, number of children per woman 
2000 1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3 
2025 1.3  1.3  1.5  1.5 
2050 1.3  1.3  2.0  2.0 
Life expectancy at birth, years 
Males 2000  59.9  59.9  59.9  59.9 
2025 59.9  68.6  59.9  68.6 
2050 59.9  77.0  59.9  77.0 
Females 2000  72.5  72.5  72.5  72.5 
2025 72.5  77.9  72.5  77.9 
2050 72.5  83.0  72.5  83.0 
Percentage aged 
65 or over, %  26.3 24.9  23.9  29.3 
Source: [Vishnevskiy et al, 2001: 139-140, 145]. 
 
Table 12. Probability demographic forecasts for Ukraine 
In-
terval  2005e  2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Number of people, thousand 
0.025 46924.8  44129.6 41258.2 38451.4 35770.9 33192.6 30917.3 28756.2 26716.6 24503.5 
0.2 46924.8  44455.8 42032.0 39649.9 37246.0 35024.1 32976.0 31090.3 29280.6 27444.4 
0.4 46924.8  44657.5 42448.1 40258.3 38102.6 36071.6 34184.3 32460.3 30851.8 29195.6 
0.6 46924.8  44821.8 42787.9 40764.8 38743.3 36873.0 35268.5 33715.8 32180.6 30576.1 
0.8 46924.8  44983.4 43179.1 41355.1 39478.1 37833.3 36315.7 34987.6 33797.6 32520.4 
0.975 46924.8  45335.6 43921.1 42518.0 41086.7 39683.1 38443.5 37616.9 36831.6 36095.0 
me-
dian  46924.8 44743.8 42608.7 40511.0 38431.5 36480.8 34788.7 33113.3 31467.2 29887.3 
Number of people over 65y.o as percent of people15-64 y.o. 
0.025 0.232 0.211 0.195 0.202 0.215 0.229 0.231 0.243 0.265 0.304 
0.2  0.232 0.213 0.200 0.210 0.226 0.242 0.247 0.264 0.290 0.338 
0.4  0.232 0.214 0.203 0.214 0.232 0.250 0.257 0.277 0.306 0.359 
0.6  0.232 0.215 0.205 0.217 0.237 0.258 0.267 0.290 0.321 0.378 
0.8  0.232 0.217 0.208 0.222 0.243 0.267 0.279 0.304 0.340 0.401 
0.975 0.232 0.219 0.213 0.230 0.255 0.282 0.299 0.333 0.381 0.460 
me-
dian  0.232 0.215 0.204 0.215 0.234 0.254 0.262 0.283 0.314 0.369 
Source: S. Pirogkov, S. Scherbov, P. Shevchuk, " Ukraine 2050: Perspectives of demo-
graphic development", State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine, 2006, 
http://ukrstat.kmu.gov.ua/statistics/wsite/niistat/Noviny/new2006/zmist_novin/demogr/roz
v.htm. 
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Table 13. Russian pension system indicators, % 
   Real pension benefits 
(1990=100%) 
Benefit to pensioner’s 
subsistence minimum 
Replacement ratio 
(average pension to 
average wage) 
1989 88.8  n.d.  n.d. 
1990 100.0  n.d.  33.7 
1991 97.0  n.d.  33.8 
1992 50.3  125.2  27.3 
1993 65.8  138.0  33.9 
1994 63.7  128.6  35.6 
1995 51.3  101.0  39.8 
1996 55.7  116.0  38.2 
1997 52.7  113.2  34.5 
1998 50.2  114.7  38.0 
1999 30.4  70.2  29.5 
2000 38.9  76.4  31.2 
2001 47.3  89.5  31.6 
2002 55.0  100.0  31.6 
2003 57.4  102.0  29.8 
2004 60.6  106.3  28.4 
2005 66.4  n.d.  27.6 
Author’s calculation by: Goskomstat (1999): Russian statistical yearbook, 1999. Goskom-
stat (1997): Social Situation and Standards of Living of Russian Population, 1997. Rosstat 
(2005): Social Situation and Standards of Living of Russian Population, 2005. 
 
 
Table 14. Changes in poverty level of Russian pensioners depending on the changes in 
their pension benefits and restriction of employment, NOBUS data, % 
Households with pensioners 
  All house-
holds  all mixed  “clear” – pen-
sioners only 
Poverty level
47 by household money incomes 
Raw data, 2003  49.1  43.2  55.6  32.7 
Scenarios:    
Pensioners are not allowed working 
(pensioners’ wage=0)  53.5 50.9  64.2  39.7 
Real pension is decreased by 10%  52.8  49.7  57.2  43.3 
Real pension is increased by 10%  45.7  37.4  53.7  23.7 
                                                 
47 Poverty level is measured according to the absolute concept. A household is poor if an 
indicator of its well-being (money incomes or disposable resources) is below the house-
hold subsistence minimum. The household subsistence minimum is calculated with regard 
to the household composition and regional official indicators of the subsistence minimum 
established for children (below 18), adults and pensioners (people of 55/60 years old and 
over). Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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Households with pensioners 
  All house-
holds  all mixed  “clear” – pen-
sioners only 
Poverty level by household maximum disposable resources
48 
Raw data, 2003  26.0  20.3  33.3  9.4 
Scenarios:    
Pensioners are not allowed working 
(pensioners’ wage=0)  26.9 21.8  35.6  10.2 
Real pension is decreased by 10%  27.0  22.0  34.6  11.7 
Real pension is increased by 10%  25.1  18.7  32.3  7.2 
Source: Sinyavskaya [2006]. 
 
Table 15. Concepts of Russian pension reform 
  1 tier  2 tier  3 tier 
1995 Concep-
tion 
Basic pensions for all 
differentiated by the 
level of disability 
Labor pensions, DB, fi-
nanced on a PAYG princi-









pensions for those 
without sufficiently 
funded pension 
Mandatory funded DC pen-
sions for all, mandatory 
occupational pensions for 





1998 Program  Social means-tested 
pensions for those 
without sufficiently 
funded pension 
Labor pensions financed on 
two bases – PAYG (NDC) 
and funded (FDC) 
Mandatory occupational 







tion and new 
framework 
Basic pensions for all 
differentiated by the 
level of disability 
+ so called “social 
security” pensions 
financed from general 
taxes  
Labor pensions financed on 
two bases – PAYG (NDC) 
and funded (FDC) 
Mandatory occupational 










                                                 
49 Disposable resources are calculated as a maximum of household incomes and expenditu-
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Table 16. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Name  Obs.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 
A pensioner worked >=1 
month  wkpens 2701  0.57  0.496  0  1 
Sex: 0 - male, 1 - female  SEX  3269  0.74  0.440  0  1 
R's age  ragey_i  3269  66.11  7.363  45  81 
Pension age  PENAGEY 3228  54.71  4.016  33  71 
Education: 
Below secondary school  RR_ED_1  3269  0.43  0.496  0  1 
Secondary school  RR_ED_2  3269  0.06  0.232  0  1 
Primary vocational  RR_ED_3  3269  0.09  0.289  0  1 
Secondary vocational  RR_ED_4  3269  0.23  0.418  0  1 
Higher RR_ED_5  3269  0.19  0.393  0  1 
Subjective estimation of health: 
good goodhl  3269  0.06  0.237  0  1 
average averagehl  3269  0.52  0.499  0  1 
bad badhl  3269  0.42  0.493  0  1 
Partner in HH  p_hh  3269  0.45  0.497  0  1 
Number of adults in HH  ADULHH  3269  0.20  0.536  0  7 
Number of children in HH  CH0_17  3269  0.02  0.139  0  2 
Occupation: 
CEOs, officials  ocup1  2749  0.01  0.107  0  1 
Professionals ocup2  2749  0.24  0.428  0  1 
Specialists ocup3  2749  0.09  0.284  0  1 
Clerks ocup4  2749  0.12  0.325  0  1 
Service workers  ocup5  2749  0.05  0.221  0  1 
Agricultural workers  ocup6  2749  0.04  0.207  0  1 
Industrial workers  ocup7  2749  0.18  0.388  0  1 
Machine operators, drivers  ocup8  2749  0.14  0.346  0  1 
Unskilled labor  ocup9  2749  0.12  0.324  0  1 
Sector: 
Industry indust  2749  0.27  0.443  0  1 
Construction constr  2749  0.07  0.255  0  1 
Transport & communica-
tion  transp 2749  0.07  0.260  0 1 
Agriculture agricult  2749  0.15  0.355  0  1 
Education, health care, cul-
ture & science  budgs 2749  0.22  0.413  0  1 
Other sectors  othsec  2749  0.22  0.416  0  1 
Has a right for early retire-
ment  eretri 3248  0.16  0.364  0  1 
Type of early retirement: 
List #1 (very hazardous 
conditions)  _Ieretgr_1 3248  0.05 0.223  0  1 
List #2 (difficult condi-
tions)  _Ieretgr_2 3248  0.02 0.147  0  1 Marek Góra, Oleksandr Rohozynsky, Oxana Sinyavskaya
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Variable Name  Obs.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 
Far North regions  _Ieretgr_3  3248  0.02  0.135  0  1 
Education, health care  _Ieretgr_4  3248  0.03  0.175  0  1 
Other professional reasons  _Ieretgr_5  3248  0.01  0.109  0  1 
Other _Ieretgr_6  3248  0.02  0.140  0  1 
Settlement: 
Town _ISTAT_2  3269  0.28  0.451  0  1 
Urban-type settlement  _ISTAT_3  3269  0.06  0.241  0  1 
Rural _ISTAT_4  3269  0.25  0.435  0  1 
Note. Sample includes pensioners aged 45 and over receiving old-age and length-of-
service pensions, who had a job at the moment of applying for a pension, excluding those 
in the army or police. 
Data: Generations and Gender Survey in Russia, 1
st wave, 2004 (N=11,261). 
 
Table 17. Probability of working after becoming a pensioner 
Men and women  Men  Women 
   Specif. 1  Specif. 2  Specif. 1  Specif. 2  Specif. 1  Specif. 2 
Females  -0.027  -0.025  – – – – 
Pension  age  -0.172 -0.170 -0.205 -0.222 0.258 0.281* 
Pension  age2  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002  -0.003*  -0.003** 
Education (below secondary school = reference) 
Secondary 
school  0.247**  0.2478**  0.583* 0.593* 0.230* 0.229* 
Primary voca-
tional  0.128 0.128 0.246 0.241 0.093 0.095 
Secondary voca-
tional  0.245*** 0.243***  0.120  0.131  0.290*** 0.290*** 
Higher  0.496***  0.496*** 0.366*  0.366* 0.579***  0.576*** 
Subjective estimation of health (average = reference) 
Good health  -0.064  -0.064  0.151  0.141  -0.284*  -0.289* 
Bad health  -0.256*** -0.247*** -0.272**  -0.250**  -0.268*** -0.265*** 
Partner in HH  -0.056  -0.057  0.052  0.054  -0.108*  -0.109* 
N  of  adults  in  HH  -0.065 -0.066 -0.133 -0.137 -0.049 -0.048 
N of children be-
low 18 in HH  0.105 0.122  1.053*  1.029 -0.117 0.091 
Occupation (machine operators & drivers = reference) 
CEOs,  officials  0.186 0.182 0.298 0.326 0.212 0.235 
Professionals 0.156  0.167  0.431*  0.474**  0.126  0.157 
Specialists 0.232*  0.248**  0.010  0.080  0.299**  0.328** 
Clerks  0.183*  0.185*  0.333 0.337 0.206  0.225* 
Service workers  0.069  0.070  -0.248  -0.248  0.087  0.102 
Agricultural 
workers  0.074 -0.101 -0.117 -0.086 0.120  0.166 
Industrial work-
ers  0.079 0.077 0.131 0.135 0.065 0.077 PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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Men and women  Men  Women 
   Specif. 1  Specif. 2  Specif. 1  Specif. 2  Specif. 1  Specif. 2 
Unskilled labor  0.287***  0.293***  0.492** 0.506** 0.309** 0.330** 
Sector (education, health care, culture & science = reference) 
Industry -0.380*** -0.397*** -0.448**  -0.502**  -0.381***  -0.409*** 
Construction -0.354*** -0.361*** -0.579**  -0.609**  -0.256*  -0.282* 
Transport & 
communication  -0.354*** -0.358*** -0.472* -0.506**  -0.333**  -0.371** 
Agriculture -0.641*** -0.643*** -0.585**  -0.609**  -0.698***  -0.714*** 
Other sectors  -0.356*** -0.370*** -0.502**  -0.553**  -0.295***  -0.324*** 
Permanent labor 
contract  – – – – – – 
Early retirement rights (no rights = reference) 
Has a right for 
early retirement  0.243***  – 0.086 –  0.354***  – 
List #1 (very 
hazardous condi-
tions) 
– 0.331*** –  0.241  – 0.484*** 
List #2 (difficult 
conditions)  – 0.350** –  0.170  –  0.597*** 
Far North re-
gions  – 0.616*** –  0.079  – 0.944*** 
Education, 
health care  – 0.150 – -0.295 – 0.168 
Other profes-
sional reasons  – 0.022 – 0.071 – 0.200 
Other –  0.091  –  -0.594  –  0.022 
Settlement (large cities = reference) 
Towns  -0.061 -0.076 -0.121 -0.115 -0.010 -0.019 
Urban-type set-
tlement  -0.118 -0.136 -0.117 -0.112 -0.110 -0.113 
Rural  -0.104 -0.117 -0.400 -0.397 -0.021 -0.024 
Regions controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled  controlled 
Const. 5.394*  5.341*  5.576  6.053  -5.331  -5.976 
N obs.  2679  727  1952 
Log likelihood  -1639.00  -1635.30  -424.95 -423.36 -1164.20  -1160.09 
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Table 18. Factors affecting duration of employment after becoming a pensioner.  
Exponential regression - accelerated failure-time form 
Both Men  Women    
Specif. 1  Specif. 2  Specif. 2  Specif. 1  Specif. 2 
Females -0.176*  -0.185**  –  –  – 
Age -0.321*** -0.327*** -0.619*** -0.285*** -0.292*** 
Age2  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Education (below secondary school = reference) 
Secondary school  0.166  0.161  0.818**  -0.008  -0.003 
Primary  vocational  0.165 0.175 0.201 0.173 0.174 
Secondary  vocational 0.093 0.080 0.236 0.077 0.055 
Higher  0.359***  0.352*** 0.258  0.300** 0.291* 
Subjective estimation of health (average = reference) 
Good health  0.064  0.088  -0.514**  0.637***  0.630*** 
Bad health  -0.376*** -0.385*** -0.728*** -0.331*** -0.356*** 
Partner in HH  -0.114  -0.124*  0.486***  -0.209*** -0.228*** 
N of adults in HH  -0.054  -0.059  0.391**  -0.088  -0.091 
N of children below 18 in 
HH  -0.283 -0.309 -0.401 -0.592 -0.605 
Occupation (machine operators & drivers = reference) 
CEOs,  officials  -0.435 -0.405 -0.390 -0.631 -0.608 
Professionals -0.367*** -0.392*** 0.016  -0.638*** -0.640*** 
Specialists -0.099  -0.114  0.255  -0.386*  -0.381* 
Clerks -0.218*  -0.230*  -0.321  -0.415*** -0.416*** 
Service workers  -0.317  -0.305  -2.081*** -0.600*** -0.556*** 
Agricultural workers  -0.068  -0.123  0.801*  -0.627**  -0.717** 
Industrial workers  -0.248**  -0.234*  -0.170  -0.437*** -0.399** 
Unskilled  labor  -0.020 -0.025 -0.035 -0.240 -0.222 
Sector (education, health care, culture & science = reference) 
Industry -0.697*** -0.654*** -0.734**  -0.948*** -0.892*** 
Construction -0.704*** -0.653*** -1.068*** -0.675*** -0.632*** 
Transport & communi-
cation  -0.446*** -0.394*** -0.915*** -0.242 -0.244 
Agriculture -0.718*** -0.689*** -0.837**  -0.656*** -0.637*** 
Other sectors  -0.474*** -0.453*** -0.857*** -0.497*** -0.491*** 
Early retirement rights (no rights = reference) 
Has a right for early re-
tirement  0.261*** –  –  0.375*** – 
List #1 (very hazardous 
conditions)  – 0.328**  -0.201  – 0.424** 
List #2 (difficult condi-
tions)  – -0.391**  -0.523  –  -0.263 
Far North regions  –  0.678***  0.225  –  0.644** 
Education,  health  care  – 0.550***  0.176  – 0.586*** 
Other professional rea-
sons  – -0.366  0.174  – -0.720 
Other –  0.420  -0.266  –  0.726** PENSION REFORM OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE… 
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Both Men  Women    
Specif. 1  Specif. 2  Specif. 2  Specif. 1  Specif. 2 
Settlement (large cities = reference) 
Towns  -0.092 -0.213 -0.280 0.044 -0.031 
Urban-type settlement  -0.292  -0.436**  -0.350  -0.180  -0.287 
Rural -0.295*  -0.395**  -0.871*** -0.078  -0.167 
Regions controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
Const. 15.993*** 16.225*** 26.724*** 14.705*** 14.945*** 
N obs.  1521  378  1143 
Log  pseudolikelyhood  -1805.98 -1796.94 -458.997  -1291.905 -1284.794 
Wald  298.15  320.69 2429.630  293.050 303.900 
Prob>ch2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 